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There was the usual waiting and the important air assumed by the
doctor, with which he was so familiar (resembling that which he
himself assumed in court), and the sounding and listening, and the
questions which called for answers that were foregone conclu-
sions .... It was all just as it was in the law courts.... It was not a
question of Ivan Ilyich's life or death, but one between a floating
kidney and appendicitis.'
Introduction
The concept of disease, which is so fundamental to medical prac-
tice, has numerous important applications in the law. It helps to in-
form or delineate reimbursable illnesses covered by health insurance,
risk-benefit calculations performed by regulatory agencies charged
with licensing therapeutic products, the scope of compensable injuries
in tort actions, the potential relevance of psychiatric evidence in
criminal trials, and impairments subject to antidiscrimination laws
and disability benefit programs. Diagnostic judgments have become
so pervasive and readily accepted in these varied contexts that we
may lose sight of their overall significance. Novel diseases occasion-
ally attract critical scrutiny, as has happened recently with the per-
ceived proliferation of psychiatric syndrome evidence in criminal tri-
als, but commentators invariably advocate doctrinal responses
designed to assist decisionmakers in properly assimilating such infor-
mation. Little or no attention is paid to the ways in which medical
professionals react to the external pressures emanating from, or me-
diated by, legal institutions with regard to defining and diagnosing
disease conditions. This Article focuses on that point of interface be-
tween the disciplines of medicine and law.
Traditionally, medical professionals defined categories of dis-
eases (nosology) and identified such conditions in particular patients
(diagnosis) for purposes of selecting appropriate treatments and pre-
dicting the likely course of the patient's illness (prognosis). Increas-
ingly, however, diagnostic judgments have come to serve other pur-
poses. Perhaps such a development is neither surprising nor worri-
some, at least so long as these diagnoses do not interfere with thera-
peutic purposes. But once the definition and identification of illness
begin primarily to serve the needs of non-medical decisionmakers
such as insurers, regulatory agencies, and litigants, closer scrutiny of
the diagnostic process is warranted. In at least some situations, re-
searchers apparently cater to patient demands for useful new disease
1. Leo Tolstoy, The Death of Ivan llyich, in ToLsToY's SHORT FIcTION 142 (Aylmer
Maude trans., Michael R. Katz ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1991) (1886).
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categories, and physicians authenticate complaints, certifying to bu-
reaucrats that particular patients suffer from a qualifying illness. To
the extent that non-medical decisionmakers influence or drive the di-
agnostic process, legitimate concerns arise about patient health, the
integrity of the medical profession, and larger costs to society. This
Article evaluates these concerns, using medical diagnosis as an or-
ganizing principle and suggesting possible responses.
Part I examines both historical and contemporary accounts of the
diagnostic process. "Diseases" are not things awaiting discovery by
researchers and physicians. Instead, they are convenient short-hand
descriptions of illnesses experienced by patients that facilitate investi-
gating and selecting possible courses of treatment. But conceptions
of illness do not serve only medical purposes; scholars and physicians
alike have recognized that diseases are socially constructed and mu-
table. Nosology and diagnosis can describe a patient's health or ill-
ness experience only imperfectly. As with language and other sys-
tems of classification, disease categories are context-dependent and
subject to manipulation.
Part II takes these insights about the social construction of dis-
ease one step further, inquiring about the legal construction of ill-
ness.2 Although in some respects subsumed within the broad contours
of arguments made by those describing the social construction of ill-
ness, the extent to which legal institutions influence and perhaps dis-
tort the diagnostic process has received essentially no consideration
and presents sufficiently distinct questions that deserve separate
treatment. Part II considers the many different pressures exerted by
public and private insurers, regulatory agencies, litigants in tort and
criminal cases, beneficiaries of disability programs, and workers'
compensation claimants. In each setting, legal institutions sometimes
rely heavily on clinical judgments but at the same time may unwit-
tingly distort the diagnostic process.
Part III evaluates the possible consequences for the health care
system of such exogenous pressures and examines the extent to which
legal rules might be reoriented to minimize any distorting effects that
they currently have on the diagnostic process. To some degree, pres-
sures mediated by legal institutions have shaped both nosology and
diagnosis, so much so that these decisionmakers may wish to rethink
their traditional reliance on judgments by biomedical researchers and
health care providers. This Article, however, concerns itself less with
2. Cf. Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1081
(1980) ("[T]he best way of understanding a legal concept is to analyze it the way a geolo-
gist looks at the landscape.... Our current legal conception of cities is similarly the rem-
nant of an historical process, so that its meaning cannot be grasped until the elements of
that process, and their relationships, are understood.").
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the consequences for legal institutions than the possible effects on the
medical profession. Although these influences are by no means the
only cause of diagnostic distortion, researchers and physicians have
responded to pressures from legal institutions in ways that do not
promote, and may even undermine, patient care and public health.
Beyond exposing these problems, this Article suggests that legal insti-
tutions should better insulate the diagnostic enterprise by delinking
their decisions from clinical judgments, and that researchers and phy-
sicians should reevaluate their role as patient advocates.
I. Differential Diagnosis and Nosology
One cannot meaningfully discuss questions about the health care
system without first having some conception of what it means to be
sick,3 and physicians obviously play a central role in identifying and
treating illness.4 Although not synonymous, disease and illness both
connote some sort of departure from normal physiological or psy-
chological functioning.5 According to one popular medical diction-
ary, "disease" means "any deviation from or interruption of the nor-
mal structure or function of any part, organ, or system (or
combination thereof) of the body that is manifested by a characteris-
tic set of symptoms and signs and whose etiology, pathology, and
prognosis may be known or unknown."' 6 Such definitions assume that
3. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 1 (3d ed. 1997) ("We need some definition of health in order to assess the
quality of care needed to promote or restore it. A malpractice suit or medical quality
audit depends on an ability to distinguish a bad from a good medical outcome.").
4. See id. at 2-3 ("A sick person can be assisted by treatment defined by the medical
model. He becomes a patient, an object of medical attention by a doctor. The doctor has
the right and the ability to label someone ill .... "). This power to identify illness has
"many ramifications" for the individual patient as well as society. See id at 3; see also
MICHAEL L. GLENN, ON DIAGNOSIS: A SYSTEMIC APPROACH xvii (1984) ("Establishing
a diagnosis is one of the physician's most basic tasks.... It is a vital criterion which affects
the organization and functioning of the entire health care system.").
5. See ARTHUR KLEINMAN, THE ILLNESS NARRATIVES: SUFFERING, HEALING,
AND THE HUMAN CONDITION 3-5 (1988) (distinguishing between illness, "the innately
human experience of symptoms and suffering," and disease, which is "what the practitio-
ner creates in the recasting of illness in terms of theories of disorder"); Christopher
Boorse, On the Distinction Between Disease and Illness, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 49, 61 (1975);
Christopher Boorse, A Rebuttal on Health, in WHAT IS DISEASE? 3, 45-50 (James M.
Humber & Robert F. Almeder eds., 1997) (explaining that a disease, which is a descriptive
and non-normative concept, rises to the level of illness, which is context- and culture-
relative, only when it is serious and incapacitating).
6. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 481 (27th ed. 1988); see also
THE OXFORD MEDICAL COMPANION 207 (1994) ("Any sickness, aliment, or departure
from the generally accepted norm of good health . . . ."); STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 492 (26th ed. 1995) ("An interruption, cessation, or disorder of body func-
tions, systems, or organs.").
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one can settle on a shared understanding of what constitutes a "nor-
mal" condition or "healthy" status. Philosophers reject an exclusively
medical conception of the term and argue that disease means differ-
ent things depending on the context in which one asks the question.
7
Before more fully elaborating on this point, let us consider an
overly simplified and perhaps nostalgic picture of the physician-
patient encounter.8 Typically, an individual prompts the intervention
of a health care professional by complaining of some physical injury
or symptom. The physician then must determine the nature of the
patient's condition with enough confidence to choose an appropriate
course of treatment. He or she usually will do so by taking a medical
history, seeking detailed information about the specific complaint,
and then physically examining the patient and perhaps ordering labo-
ratory or other diagnostic tests.9
Once the fact gathering process concludes, the health care pro-
fessional will attempt to diagnose the patient's condition.10 Through a
process of differential diagnosis, which involves a consideration of a
7. See LAWRIE REZNEK, THE NATURE OF DISEASE 1, 211-13 (1987); Lester S. King,
What Is Disease?, 21 PHIL. Sci. 193, 197 (1954); Harold Merskey, Variable Meanings for
the Definition of Disease, 11 J. MED. & PHIL. 215 (1986).
Disease is a state of malfunction of body or mind that is a matter of concern to
the patient, his doctors, and other relevant persons, subject to the qualifications
that the malfunction has to be defined from case to case and that the conse-
quences of the disease for the patient's obligations to others (and theirs to him)
will be determined by the patient and his doctors with the consent of other rele-
vant persons.
Id. at 229-30 (emphasis omitted). Professor Merskey identified insurers and courts as
among the other relevant actors that may have differing conceptions of disease. See id. at
225-29. He hastened to add that courts are not "the final arbiter[s] of a medical diagnosis"
but can only decide whether or not to accept a diagnosis for legal purposes. Id. at 227-28.
8. For significantly more comprehensive and sophisticated accounts, see EDMUND D.
PELLEGRINO & DAVID C. THOMASMA, A PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF MEDICAL
PRACrICE (1981); Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Four Models of the Physician-
Patient Relationship, 267 JAMA 2221 (1992). For an account that emphasizes the patient's
perspective, see S. KAY TOOMBS, THE MEANING OF ILLNESS: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL
ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES OF PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT 89 (1992)
(arguing that illness "mean[s] something significantly and qualitatively different to the pa-
tient and to the physician," reflecting "the fundamental and decisive distinction between
the lived experience of illness and the naturalistic account of such experience").
9. See PAUL CUTLER, PROBLEM SOLVING IN CLINICAL MEDICINE: FROM DATA TO
DIAGNOSIS (3d ed. 1998); 2 ERIC J. CASSELL, TALKING WITH PATIENTS: CLINICAL
TECHNIQUE 86-90 (1985) (discussing the importance of care in constructing a patient's
medical history).
10. See Ralph L. Engel, Jr. & B.J. Davis, Medical Diagnosis: Present, Past, and Future,
112 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 512 (1963); Lester S. King, What Is a Diagnosis?, 202
JAMA 714 (1967); Robert G. Miceli, Deprivation of Due Process for Physicians: The
"Failure to Diagnose" Cause of Action, 33 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 859, 871-85 (1989) (summa-
rizing the diagnostic process).
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hierarchy of different possible explanations for the results of the ini-
tial examination,' the physician tries to determine the most likely
source of the complaint. This essentially probabilistic exercise re-
quires reference to a catalog of diseases and their diagnostic criteria,
as developed by clinical researchers and learned by the health care
professional. Often the nature of the injury or disease will be obvi-
ous, such as a fractured limb, but some ambiguity exists in many situa-
tions. If the physician cannot reasonably settle upon a diagnosis, he
or she may refer the patient to another physician, often a specialist in
a particular field, for a consultation.
Patients seek out medical care in hopes of finding a treatment for
some bothersome condition.' 2 They usually care little about the name
of their affliction. Similarly, physicians diagnose patients as a means
to the end of identifying the most appropriate therapy.' 3 It may be
that, if there are several plausible diagnoses for a condition but fur-
ther specification would serve no purpose given the nature of avail-
able treatments, the health care professional will not pursue addi-
tional diagnostic inquiries for their own sake.' 4 Similarly, physicians
11. See ARTHUR S. ELSTEIN ET AL., MEDICAL PROBLEM SOLVING: AN ANALYSIS OF
CLINICAL REASONING 277 (1978) ("Ill-defined problems must be progressively better de-
fined so that rational action can be taken. Alternative interpretations of probabilistic data
must be generated and compared.... As in other domains of problem solving, the poten-
tial size of the problem space is enormous."); Jerome P. Kassirer, Clinical Problem-
Solving-A New Feature in the Journal, 326 NEw ENG. J. MED. 60, 60 (1992) ("In many
ways the diagnostic process resembles the start of a chess game: after one or two moves
(one or two symptoms), the number of possible moves (diagnostic possibilities) is usually
enormous; ... the challenge is to make the right move in the right direction at the right
time.").
12. See PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 8, at 211.
13. See id. at 136-38.
14. See, e.g., JOHN I. BALLA, THE DIAGNOSTIC PROCESS: A MODEL FOR CLINICAL
TEACHERS 54 (1985) ("[D]iagnostic perfectionism differed a great deal from one disease
to another.... [I]n situations where no reasonable treatment was available and where the
condition had little effect on life, diagnostic utility would be low and accuracy would be
relatively unimportant."); id. at 95 ("[I]ncreased precision for its own sake is of no benefit
in any scientific endeavour.... In the days when tuberculosis and carcinoma of the lung
were untreatable, a vague diagnosis of chest disease may have been satisfactory."); Ernan
McMullin, Diagnosis by Computer, in LOGIC OF DISCOVERY AND DIAGNOSIS IN
MEDICINE 199, 218 (Kenneth F. Schaffner ed., 1985) ("Clinical medicine... does not aim
at theoretical understanding. It aims at the practical goal of therapy, though it uses what-
ever theoretical science is available."); Herbert A. Simon, Artificial-Intelligence Ap-
proaches to Problem Solving and Clinical Diagnosis, in LOGIC OF DISCOVERY, supra, at
72, 87 ("From the therapeutic or 'troubleshooting' standpoint we want to follow the causal
stream up to a point where intervention is possible."); King, supra note 10, at 716
("[Mierely because the diagnostic categories exist, does not mean that they must be
used.... A diagnostic framework suitable for a research scientist may be quite unneces-
sary for a practicing physician." (emphasis omitted)); see also Jerome P. Kassirer & Ste-
phen G. Pauker, Editorial, The Toss-Up, 305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1467 (1981).
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may have to revisit their initial diagnosis in the event that the pa-
tient's condition does not improve with the prescribed therapy. Phy-
sicians view patient care as an iterative process designed to treat a
condition to the best extent possible. 15 They do not care much about
the disease's etiology-the theory of its origin or cause-unless un-
derstanding causation would assist in diagnosis and treatment. For
instance, in treating appendicitis, physicians focus on the site and ex-
tent of inflammation rather than struggling in vain to establish its un-
derlying cause.
Diagnoses may be inaccurate for any number of reasons.16 First,
the manner of taking a medical history or eliciting details about the
patient's present complaints may adversely influence the process of
gathering information. Second, errors may occur in conducting or in-
terpreting laboratory tests. Third, physicians may inappropriately cut
short the process of engaging in a differential diagnosis or misjudge
the probabilities of competing explanations. Finally, the presence of
multiple medical conditions may confound the selection of the best
treatment.
So far, the discussion has focused on the medical evaluation of
physical injuries and organic diseases (pathophysiological conditions),
but this obviously does not exhaust the range of possible symptoms or
diagnoses. Estimates suggest that at least twenty percent of the
population will suffer a significant mental disorder at some point
during their lifetimes. 17 Indeed, the likely interaction between physi-
cal and mental illnesses further complicates any effort to single out
the cause of, and best treatment for, a patient's complaint, but psychi-
atric diagnoses present a host of additional challenges.'8
15. See GLENN, supra note 4, at 83, 90 (describing the dialectical process in diagnosis
and treatment); K. Danner Clouser, Approaching the Logic of Diagnosis, in LOGIC OF
DISCOVERY, supra note 14, at 35, 39 ("In trying to arrive at a classification, that is, a dis-
ease or illness label, the processes of data gathering and diagnosis are in no set sequence.
The physician goes back and forth; progress on one front gives rise to suggested possibili-
ties on the other.").
16. See GLENN, supra note 4, at 65, 82-83; Jack D. Myers, The Process of Clinical Di-
agnosis and Its Adaptation to the Computer, in LOGIC OF DISCOVERY, supra note 14, at
155, 156-57; Nelda P. Wray & Joan A. Friedland, Detection and Correction of House Staff
Error in Physical Diagnosis, 249 JAMA 1035 (1983).
17. See Laura Lee Hall, The Biology of Mental Disorders, 269 JAMA 844, 844 (1993);
see also Ronald C. Kessler et al., Lifetime and 12-Month Prevalence of DSM-I1I-R Psychi-
atric Disorders in the United States: Results from the National Comorbidity Survey, 51
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 8, 14 (1994) (finding that almost half of all respondents to a
survey reported at least one psychiatric disorder during their lifetime).
18. See Henry Berry, The Merits of an Opinion and the Diagnosis of Diagnosis, 18
ADVOCS. Q. 330, 340-47 (1996) (distinguishing between medical, psychiatric, and psycho-
logical diagnoses). See generally GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL
EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS (2d ed. 1997).
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First, mental health professionals typically take a patient's sub-
jective complaints at face value, without any meaningful way of at-
tempting to verify the nature or severity of their symptoms.'9 Second,
mental health professionals often express greater disagreements
about an appropriate diagnosis for a particular patient because the
relevant symptoms tend to be non-specific, which means that any
number of mental illnesses could account for the particular com-
plaint.20 Even for fairly well-accepted psychiatric disorders, diagnos-
tic judgments are notoriously unreliable. 21 Third, differential diagno-
sis-the effort to arrive at the most probable single source of the
patient's condition or symptom(s)-often serves little purpose in se-
lecting among the more limited range of available treatment modali-
ties. In fact, psychotherapy typically comes before the post hoc as-
signment of a diagnosis. Psychiatrists and psychologists still tailor
their interventions to the particular patient,22 but some would say that
19. See People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, 300 (Cal. 1984) ("Because their function is to
help their clients deal with the trauma they are experiencing, the historical accuracy of the
client's descriptions of the details of the traumatizing events is not vital in their task."); see
also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1996) (distinguishing, in the course of recog-
nizing an evidentiary privilege for psychotherapist-patient communications, psychother-
apy from the treatment of physical ailments by a physician based on "objective" informa-
tion).
20. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985) ("Psychiatry is not ... an exact
science, and psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental ill-
ness, on the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and symptoms, on cure
and treatment, and on likelihood of future dangerousness."); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 430 (1979) ("The subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis render certainties
virtually beyond reach in most situations."); Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psy-
chiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L.
REV. 693, 719-32 (1974) (elaborating on the reasons for unreliability in psychiatric diagno-
ses); David Faust & Jay Ziskin, The Expert Witness in Psychology and Psychiatry, 241
SCIENCE 31, 34 (1988) ("Clinicians frequently cannot agree on psychiatric diagnoses of
current states, much less provide trustworthy answers to less familiar and more difficult
forensic questions, which often demand projections backward or forward in time."); ac-
cord Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental
Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 554-60, 604-11 (1978). But see Jules B. Gerard, The
Usefulness of the Medical Model to the Legal System, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 377, 398-403,
418 (1987) (responding to criticisms of diagnostic unreliability but only by first excluding
the majority of identified mental disorders as not diseases in the traditional sense and
therefore not of interest for legal purposes).
21. See KENNETH MARK COLBY & JAMES E. SPAR, THE FUNDAMENTAL CRISIS IN
PSYCHIATRY: UNRELIABILITY OF DIAGNOSIS 4-11, 21 (1983); James C. Anthony et al.,
Comparison of the Lay Diagnostic Interview Schedule and a Standardized Psychiatric Di-
agnosis, 42 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 667, 672 (1985); Matthew P. Dumont, The Non-
specificity of Mental Illness, 54 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 326, 327-28 (1984); Graham
Mellsop et al., The Reliability of Axis II of DSM-III, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1360, 1361
(1982).
22. See generally EILEEN GAMBRILL, CRITICAL THINKING IN CLINICAL PRACTICE:
IMPROVING THE ACCURACY OF JUDGMENTS AND DECISIONS ABOUT CLIENTS (1990).
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efforts at labeling a mental illness with any degree of specificity are
largely beside the point33
There remain important questions about the very nature of dis-
ease as distinct from the processes used to identify previously defined
diseases in particular patients. Successful diagnosis and treatment
depend, of course, on biomedical research into the nature of disease
processes and various possible avenues for therapy. Scientists at-
tempt, therefore, to denominate classes of persons suffering from cer-
tain symptoms in order to promote basic and applied research. Al-
though a physician may enjoy the luxury of taking a particularistic
view of each patient and customizing appropriate therapies,24 clinical
researchers depend on generalizations and some shared understand-
ing so that results of studies can be cumulated and compared. This
basically taxonomic process of identifying and classifying diseases is
referred to as nosology. As with physicians, clinical researchers
struggle to define diseases less for their own sake than in order to
pursue applied research into appropriate treatments2 As with diag-
noses, these definitions may evolve over time as additional scientific
information accumulates. Disease concepts are not fixed and static.
Ever since the ancient Greeks,26 physicians have struggled in
their attempts to describe and classify diseases. Nosology developed
23. See COLBY & SPAR, supra note 21, at 11 ("[E]xperienced clinicians do not use the
official diagnostic system much, either in helping their patients or in informally communi-
cating with one another.... Practitioners treat clinical phenomena more than diseases.");
id. at 211-12; ANDREW S. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 383-85, 437-38 (rev. ed.
1978). But cf. R.E. KENDELL, THE ROLE OF DIAGNOSIS IN PSYCHIATRY 2-8 (1975) (con-
ceding weaknesses in psychiatric diagnoses, but disputing claims that they are entirely ir-
relevant). For instance, many psychoanalysts regard diagnostic labels as irrelevant to
treatment. See Bernard L. Diamond & David W. Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an Expert
Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1335, 1337-39 (1965); Paul
Williams, Deciding How to Treat-The Relevance of Psychiatric Diagnosis, 9 PSYCHOL.
MED. 179, 182-83 (1979). A few have gone so far as to assert that there is no such thing as
mental illness. See THOMAS S. SZASz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS: FOUNDATIONS
OF A THEORY OF PERSONAL CONDUCT 294-97 (1961) (calling it a medical metaphor for
behavioral problems).
24. See ERIC J. CASSELL, THE NATURE OF SUFFERING AND THE GOALS OF
MEDICINE 179 (1991) (explaining that physicians "treat particular patients in particular
circumstances at a particular moment in time, and thus they require information that par-
ticularizes the individual and the moment").
25. See HENRIK R. WULFF, RATIONAL DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT (1976); H. Tris-
tram Engelhardt, Jr., Typologies of Disease: Nosologies Revisited, in LOGIC OF
DISCOVERY, supra note 14, at 56,56 ("argu[ing] that for medicine, concepts of disease and
typologies of disease are properly therapy-oriented"); id. at 63-64 (noting, however, that
"one sees an ongoing attempt to standardize medical diagnoses and information gather-
ing" for non-therapeutic purposes); id. at 67 ("One should develop classifications of dis-
ease with a view to maximizing the achievement of the goals of treatment and preven-
tion.").
26. See GALEN ON THE AFFECTED PARTS (Rudolph E. Siegel trans., S. Karger 1976).
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during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, initially by defining
diseases as observable symptom complexes.27 Thus, patients with
seemingly identical symptomology were classified together. During
the nineteenth century, nosology shifted from a focus on shared non-
specific symptoms to an appreciation of the specific etiology under-
lying a pattern of symptoms.28 Technological advances played some
role in this transformation, promoting improvements in clinical re-
search and practice.29 Eventually, however, critics challenged the
emerging ontological conception of illness (the notion that disease
amounts to a meaningful concept, abstracted from any one patient's
experience, simply waiting to be discovered), superficially resembling
the legal realist assault on nineteenth century classical legal ortho-
doxy.30 Instead, these critics emphasized that physicians ultimately
must treat individual patients complaining of particular ailments.
31
Nonetheless, nosological work and accompanying controversies about
selecting appropriate diagnostic criteria persist to this day.
In a provocative new book, Robert Aronowitz discusses the "so-
cial construction" of illness,32 elaborating on themes developed by a
number of earlier scholars who denied that medical diagnosis simply
represented a technical and value-neutral exercise. 33 He juxtaposes
27. See KNUD FABER, NOSOGRAPHY: THE EVOLUTION OF CLINICAL MEDICINE IN
MODERN TIMES 20-27,208-09 (2d rev. ed. 1930). Indeed, the father of modem taxonomy
in the biological sciences included diseases among his subjects for classification. See
CAROLUS LINNAEUS, GENERA MORBORUM (1763).
28. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF
MEDICAL PERCEPTION 188-91 (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., Pantheon Books 1973);
LESTER S. KING, TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN MEDICINE 96, 138-40, 171, 239
(1991). "A continuity of problems bound the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries. The
same problems have persisted in the twentieth century .... First, What is disease? And
second, How do you identify it?" Id. at 232; see also id. at 233 ("When [symptoms] cohere
and interact and form a temporal pattern, we can speak of a disease. A particular pattern
will acquire a name as a sort of handle that makes discourse easier and facilitates diagno-
sis.").
29. See STANLEY JOEL REISER, MEDICINE AND THE REIGN OF TECHNOLOGY 18-19,
227-31 (1978).
30. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 198-202 (1992).
31. See Charles E. Rosenberg, Disease and Social Order in America: Perceptions and
Expectations, in AIDS: THE BURDENS OF HISTORY 12, 17-21 (Elizabeth Fee & Daniel M.
Fox eds., 1988).
32. See ROBERT A. ARONOWITZ, MAKING SENSE OF ILLNESS: SCIENCE, SOCIETY,
AND DISEASE 10-15, 171 (1998) ("[T]he acts of disease recognition, naming, and classifica-
tion-whether one is conceptualizing fatigue or obstruction of the coronary arteries as dis-
ease-are always contingent on social factors."); see also Joseph S. Alpert, Society and
Disease, 279 JAMA 1665 (1998) (book review).
33. See, e.g., FRAMING DISEASE: STUDIES IN CULTURAL HISTORY (Charles E. Ro-
senberg & Janet Golden eds., 1992); THE PROBLEM OF MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE:
EXAMINING THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF MEDICINE (Peter Wright & Andrew
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several recent case studies-chronic fatigue syndrome, ulcerative coli-
tis, Lyme disease, and coronary heart disease-in order to explore the
extent to which understandings about, and the diagnostic criteria for,
these conditions have been framed by influences other than advances
in biomedical science. Dr. Aronowitz criticizes the excessive biologi-
cal reductionism fostered by overreliance on the medical model of
disease, arguing that physicians should come to recognize more
clearly the inevitable idiosyncracies of their patients, and urging a
shift from an ontological (objective/anatomical) to a more holistic
(subjective/experiential) conception of ilnessY4 In a sense, disease
categories and boundaries are not discovered but invented from
among several competing choices, and he argues that one should
measure nosologies by reference to non-epistemic purposes. Al-
though by no means uncontroversial, the book provides important in-
sights about the still fluid and increasingly contentious nature of no-
sology and diagnosis.35
Like others who have previously written in this vein, Aronowitz
pays essentially no attention to the potentially influential role of legal
proceedings and institutions in defining the contours of disease. He
identifies patient groups as one of the primary sources of pressure in
the process of negotiating over the boundaries of disease definitions,
36
Treacher eds., 1982); see also DAVID MECHANIC, MEDICAL SOCIOLOGY (2d ed. 1978);
FREDRIC D. WOLINSKY, THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH: PRINCIPLES, PRACrITIONERS,
AND ISSUES (2d ed. 1988); CONCEPTS OF HEALTH AND DISEASE: INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES (Arthur L. Caplan et al. eds., 1981); HEALTH, DISEASE, AND CAUSAL
EXPLANATIONS IN MEDICINE 3-90 (Lennart Nordenfelt & B. Ingemar B. Lindahl eds.,
1984). See generally PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCrION OF REALITY (1966).
34. See ARONOwrrz, supra note 32, at 8-10 (distinguishing between ontological and
holistic ideal-types of illness); id. at 174 ("One reason that we need to question our reli-
ance on the ontological ideal is that it results in continuous pressure on both patients and
physicians to create new and eventually controversial medical diagnoses such as chronic
fatigue syndrome that have the appearance of specificity.. . ."); id. at 175 ("While it is not
unusual for doctors to bemoan the popularity of such diagnoses, little attention has been
paid to biomedicine's role in creating the market in the first place by its collective inability
to accommodate suffering not understandable in such [mechanistic] terms."); id. at 184-85,
189; see also GLENN, supra note 4, at xxv, 158-59, 176-79 (urging a systemic approach that
takes into account psychosocial factors and the role of the patient's family); James S.
Goodwin, Chaos, and the Limits of Modern Medicine, 278 JAMA 1399, 1399-400 (1997).
35. See ARONOWITZ, supra note 32, at 185. For instance, he rejects the notion that
"there is a right or true definition of Lyme disease. It is a matter of some choice-within
biologically given limits-as to how we might define the disease.... Values will still need
to be debated and interests balanced." Id. at 180.
36. See id. at 168 ("Undoubtedly, sociocultural trends such as the increased question-
ing of biomedical authority and the rise of consumerism have emboldened patients to ac-
tively promote new, legitimizing diagnoses, in turn leading to an increased number of-
and more strident--controversies over disease legitimacy.").
If physicians would accept their patients' self-report of suffering as legitimate,
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but individual patients also look to lawyers to pursue goals that may
place significant indirect pressures on physicians to define and iden-
tify diseases that have some valuable legal ramifications. Thus, legal
institutions may mediate the demands of such patients, yet no one has
systematically assessed the role that the law plays in the diagnostic
enterprise.37 As another commentator recently recognized: "One of
the most neglected members of the cast.., is the American legal pro-
fession; the law and lawyers have played a subtle, but often signifi-
cant, role in 'framing' disease.
'38
H. Legal Institutions and Illness
It should surprise no one to discover the numerous contexts in
which nosological categories and particular diagnoses assume legal
relevance. Disease definitions and clinical judgments routinely affect
coverage and reimbursement decisions by health insurers, the licens-
ing determinations of regulatory agencies that review new therapeutic
technologies, evidentiary and substantive rulings by the judiciary in
personal injury lawsuits and criminal trials, eligibility decisions in dis-
rather than solely by the presence of an objective abnormality, the stakes for a
specific diagnosis would be much lower. As a result, there would be less reason
to fight tooth and nail for the acceptance of specific diseases to rationalize suf-
fering.
Id. at 175. Aronowitz also argues that modifications in the definitions of disease may re-
flect turf battles among groups of physicians. See id. at 179 ("The shift from the experien-
tial definition of angina pectoris to the more anatomically defined [coronary heart disease]
allowed the emerging specialty of cardiology to focus its new techniques on patients who
suffered from specific cardiac ailments, while taking patients and status away from general
practitioners.").
37. A few of these commentators mention the role of legal institutions only to shunt
such questions aside as beyond their focus on other societal influences on the diagnostic
process. See, e.g., GLENN, supra note 4, at 33, 102. "Another category of diagnosis in-
cludes occasions when physicians are asked to provide expert opinion about their patient
to a third party. In this group are physicians' letters to welfare departments, the courts,
insurance companies, employers, schools, disability, social security, and other public agen-
cies." Id. at 148. The so-called "therapeutic jurisprudence" represents a very different
research program, arguing that greater attention should be paid to the manner in which
legal rules and procedures inevitably affect the mental health of individuals, and recom-
mending various reforms designed to promote the therapeutic consequences of the law.
See DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:
DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE xvii (1996); BRUCE J. WINICK,
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW 3-4
(1997); Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 193 (1995).
38. Janet A. Tighe, The Legal Art of Psychiatric Diagnosis: Searching for Reliability, in
FRAMING DISEASE, supra note 33, at 206, 207 (focusing only on forensic psychiatric testi-
mony); see also Charles E. Rosenberg, Framing Disease: Illness, Society, and History, in
FRAMING DISEASE, supra note 33, at xiii, xxi (noting in passing that negotiations about
the definitions of disease may be played out in a variety of legal proceedings).
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ability programs, and the resolution of claims brought before work-
ers' compensation tribunals. The applications and influences of
medical diagnoses vary among these diverse judicial and bureaucratic
settings,39 but each of the following examples illustrates how legal in-
stitutions do more than passively accept nosological categories and
particular diagnoses designed to serve therapeutic purposes.
In order to appreciate these multifaceted influences, a broad but
inevitably superficial exposition of each of these contexts provides the
indispensable backdrop for an analysis of the legal construction of
disease. As more fully elaborated in Part III, the ready legal accep-
tance of disease definitions may in turn shape or even distort nosol-
ogy and diagnosis by medical professionals.
A. Public and Private Health Insurers
Federal agencies charged with administering public health insur-
ance programs have imposed payment restrictions on medical treat-
ments that depend on making particular diagnoses. For instance, the
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) uses diagnosis-
related groups (DRGs) to manage hospital reimbursement under the
Medicare program. Private insurers have imposed comparable pay-
ment restrictions. Moreover, in both of these contexts, insurance
coverage may depend in the first instance on how broadly one defines
the terms disease and illness.
Originally, DRGs were designed as an internal management tool
for hospitals. 40 DRGs classify hospital patients based upon their pri-
mary and secondary diagnoses, procedures performed, age, status at
discharge, and any complications.41 By assigning one of the almost
500 DRGs to each discharged patient, hospital administrators could
better anticipate treatment costs and more efficiently manage their
budgets. If the average cost for treating patients within any given
DRG exceeded forecasts, the hospital might decide to adjust its
treatment protocols or perhaps renegotiate contracts with suppliers
and insurers. If certain physicians utilized greater resources than
forecast, the administrators might choose to institute better cost con-
39. The use here and elsewhere of the term "bureaucratic" distinguishes a variety of
administrative agencies and other non-judicial institutions from the courts, and it also
connotes a style of decision-making and concentration of power typical of large and com-
plex organizations. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT
AGENcIEs Do AND WHY THEY Do IT (1989); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureauc-
racy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984).
40. For a comprehensive discussion of DRGs by the team of researchers who origi-
nally developed them, see DRGs: THEIR DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT (Robert B. Fetter
et al. eds., 1991).
41. See PAUL L. GRIMALDI & JULIE A. MICHELETTI, DIAGNOSIS RELATED
GROUPS: A PRACrITIONER'S GUIDE 19-38 (2d ed. 1983).
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trols. If the case-mix of patients treated at the hospital changed over
time, the hospital might have to reallocate its resources or reconsider
its patient population.
DRGs depend on a uniform classification system for diagnoses.
Currently, most health providers use the ninth revision of the Inter-
national Classification of Diseases-Clinical Modification (ICD-9-
CM),42 a system designed for indexing medical records. Physicians
reduce their patient diagnoses to one or more of the 10,000 ICD-9-
CM codes.43 For instance, Legionnaires' disease would be assigned
code number 482.84.44 Hospital administrators use these coded diag-
noses to aggregate patients with similar conditions into DRGs in or-
der to predict average treatment costs and plan hospital budgets. Le-
gionnaires' disease would be included in DRGs 79-81 ("Respiratory
Infections & Inflammations"), depending on the patient's age and the
presence of any complications. 45 The entire system therefore depends
on the physician's initial diagnosis, something which hospital adminis-
trators would rarely have any occasion to second-guess.
As an internal management tool, DRGs had fairly limited utility
and virtually no effect on the diagnostic process, but they have be-
come much more important now that public and private insurers use
them as a basis for reimbursing treatment costs, in effect utilizing
DRGs for external budgeting. Rather than indemnifying hospitals
and physicians for the actual or reasonable costs expended in treating
a covered patient, insurers now frequently base their payments on the
average treatment costs forecast by the DRGs for each discharged pa-
tient covered by the insurer.
The Medicare program initially reimbursed hospitals and physi-
cians for the reasonable costs of treating covered disabled and elderly
patients. In 1983, however, Congress directed HCFA to use the
42. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, THE INTERNATIONAL
CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES-CLINICAL MODIFICATION (5th ed. 9th rev. 1995);
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES,
INJURIES, AND CAUSES OF DEATH (9th rev. ed. 1977). The tenth edition of the lCD was
published in 1992 but has not yet come into official use in the United States.
43. See David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages Assess-
ments, 80 IowA L. REV. 1109, 1163 (1995) (noting that ICD-9 codes "are routinely used
throughout American medical practice to classify injuries, illnesses, diseases, medical
treatment, and rehabilitation," and urging courts to use this classification system in re-
viewing damage awards); see also Catherine Hoffman et al., Persons with Chronic Condi-
tions: Their Prevalence and Costs, 276 JAMA 1473, 1474 (1996) (using ICD-9 codes in
public health research).
44. See 62 Fed. Reg. 29,902,29,991 (1997). The federal government reprints and occa-
sionally updates the ICD-9-CM codes. See 61 Fed. Reg. 27,444, 27,451 (1996) (describing
the process). For a discussion of one update, see Christine K. Cassel & Bruce C. Vladeck,
ICD-9 Code for Palliative or Terminal Care, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1232,1233 (1996).
45. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 29,983, 29,991.
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DRGs as the basis for Medicare reimbursement of hospitals, estab-
lishing the Prospective Payment System (PPS).46 The statute explic-
itly precludes judicial review of DRG definitions.47 Even so, as one
critic of the system has explained, this shift effectively transferred the
power to define diseases from clinicians to legal institutions:
At the beginning of Medicare, the authority to attribute severity of
illness lay largely in the hands of the medical profession. The very
idea of prospective payment was to displace that authority to a
great extent. The authority to define illness and severity of illness,
however, did not simply disappear.... [PPS] moved much of this
authority to Congress, HCFA, ProPAC [the Prospective Payment
Assessment Commission], and the health services research commu-
nity more generally.48
As explained later in this Article, DRG-based reimbursement has
triggered diagnostic "upcoding" by some physicians in an effort to
circumvent Medicare PPS payment restrictions.
49
In 1989, Congress directed HCFA to pay physicians treating
Medicare patients using a similar concept called the "resource-based
relative value scale" (RBRVS), though it sets fees based on the
46. See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 601, 97 Stat. 65, 149
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (1994)); see also 42 C.F.R. pt. 412 (1998)
(HCFA's implementing regulations); Judith R. Lave, The Impact of the Medicare Prospec-
tive Payment System and Recommendations for Change, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 499 (1990); J.
Timothy Phillips & Don E. Wineberg, Medicare Prospective Payment A Quiet Revolution,
87 W. VA. L. REV. 13 (1984); Bruce C. Vladeck, Medicare Hospital Payment by Diagnosis-
Related Groups, 100 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 576 (1984). Congress recently decided to
require a similar prospective payment system to replace cost-based Medicare reimburse-
ment for outpatient services. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33,
§ 4523(a), 111 Stat. 330,445 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13951(t)).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(7) (1994) ("There shall be no administrative or judicial
review... [of] the establishment of diagnosis-related groups, of the methodology for the
classification of discharges within such groups, and of the appropriate weighing of factors
thereof....").
48. David M. Frankford, The Complexity of Medicare's Hospital Reimbursement Sys-
tem: Paradoxes of Averaging, 78 IOWA L. REV. 517, 665 (1993) (adding that "these actors
are uncomfortable with that transfer" and "constantly look back to the medical profes-
sion"). Another commentator has made a similar point:
Under a system of retrospective reimbursement, research, driven solely by clini-
cal concerns, results in a proliferation of categories and classifications of mental
disorders that lose their utility for administrative and reimbursement concerns.
Within the present framework of prospective payment, the interest of third-party
payers is providing clear parameters for the clinical work, informing its questions,
purposes, and outcomes,... accentuat[ing] the control of payers over providers.
Mary Ruggie, Retrenchment or Realignment? U.S. Mental Health Policy and DRGs, 15 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 145, 157 (1990) ("[W]hen research speaks to developments that
have implications for reimbursement, administrative efficiency and cost implications drive
the process of further redefinition in diagnostic categories." (footnote omitted)).
49. See infra Part III.B.
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course of treatment selected rather than the diagnosis. 50 For this pur-
pose, physicians utilize the codes from the fourth edition of the
AMA's Current Procedural Terminology (CPT-4), which covers more
than 7,000 medical procedures and services.51 Although not identical
to Medicare's PPS and RBRVS reimbursement methods, other health
insurers also have linked their payments to the ICD-9-CM and CPT-4
codes appearing in patient charts.
52
Whatever the method used for reimbursement, questions some-
times also arise about coverage. For instance, Medicare only covers
expenses for items or services which are "reasonable and necessary
for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to improve the
functioning of a malformed body member. '53 The selection of a
medical intervention traditionally had been left to the judgment of a
physician, but nowadays both public and private insurers increasingly
struggle when deciding whether a therapy should be considered nec-
essary. Although disputes about medical necessity usually concern
the selection or duration of treatments, especially when reimburse-
ment is sought for "experimental" therapies, 54 diagnosis of a disease
50. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6102, 103
Stat. 2106, 2169 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4 (1994)); John K. Inglehart,
The New Law on Medicare's Payments to Physicians, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1247 (1990);
see also Charles J. Dougherty, The Resource-Based Relative Value Scale: An Ethical As-
sessment, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1061, 1067 (1990) ("It is only fair then that physician pay-
ments, one of the major sources of out-patient costs, should come under the same kind of
scrutiny and constraint imposed on hospital payments by the DRG's."); Janet B. Mitchell,
Physician DRGs, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 670 (1985) (identifying problems with a DRG-
like approach to reimbursing physicians).
51. AMA, CURRENT PROCEDURAL TERMINOLOGY (4th rev. ed. 1998); see also
KENNETH R. WING ET AL., THE LAW AND AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 538 (1998)
("[T]he CPT-4 code system is the preferred and most common method of describing phy-
sician services for reimbursement purposes."). Medicare now requires the use of CPT-4
coding. See id. ("In 1983, CPT-4 was adopted by HCFA as part of the coding system used
in billing for services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries.").
52. See Grace M. Carter et al., Use of Diagnosis-Related Groups by Non-Medicare
Payers, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Winter 1994, at 127; see also New York St. Conf. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 649-50 (1995) (reviewing a
state statute that mandated the use of DRGs for all hospital patient charges); David M.
Eddy, Oregon's Methods: Did Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Fail?, 266 JAMA 2135, 2136
(1991) (describing one state's use of ICD-9 and CPT-4 codes to establish a system for ra-
tioning Medicaid services); David M. Eddy, Oregon's Plan: Should It Be Approved?, 266
JAMA 2439, 2444 (1991) (arguing that the ICD-9 codes are too crude for Medicaid ra-
tioning).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (1994); see also Timothy P. Blanchard, "Medical Neces-
sity" Denials as a Medicare Part B Cost-Containment Strategy: Two Wrongs Don't Make It
Right or Rational, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 939, 972-1021 (1990); Eleanor D. Kinney, National
Coverage Policy Under the Medicare Program: Problems and Proposals for Change, 32 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 869 (1988).
54. See Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers' Assessment of Medical
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provides the essential predicate for coverage. In addition, the appli-
cation of pre-existing condition exclusions depends on defining the
point at which someone develops such a condition.55
Disputes about coverage denials sometimes find their way into
court, forcing judges and jurors to assess claims that a particular con-
dition qualifies as an illness. 56 In one recent decision, a court held
that "breast-ovarian carcinoma syndrome" represented an illness un-
der the terms of a health insurance policy and, therefore, that radical
prophylactic surgery should have been covered as medically neces-
sary.57 The court rejected the insurer's argument that this syndrome
amounted to nothing more than a genetic predisposition-diagnosed
from nothing more than the patient's family history of breast and
ovarian cancer-for the development of a disease at some indefinite
point in the future.58 Although not based on any detected chromo-
somal abnormality, the court noted that women with the plaintiff's
family history had at least an even chance of eventually developing
Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1637 (1992); Richard S. Saver, Note, Reimbursing New
Technologies: Why Are the Courts Judging Experimental Medicine?, 44 STAN. L. REV.
1095 (1992); Annotation, What Services, Equipment, or Supplies Are "Medically Neces-
sary" for Purposes of Coverage Under Medical Insurance, 75 A.L.R.4th 763 (1990 & Supp.
1998).
55. See Hardester v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 841 F. Supp. 714, 715-16 (D. Md.
1994) (distinguishing previously detected fibrocystic breast disease from subsequently di-
agnosed breast cancer, and holding that treatment of the latter disease was not excluded
from coverage by a pre-existing condition clause), affd, 52 F.3d 70, 71 (4th Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (per curiam); Pitcher v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 870 F. Supp. 903, 907-16 (S.D.
Ind. 1994) (same), affd, 93 F.3d 407 (7th Cir. 1996); Fuglsang v. Blue Cross, 456 N.W.2d
281,285 (Neb. 1990) ("A disease, condition, or illness exists within the meaning of a health
insurance policy excluding preexisting conditions only at such time as the disease, condi-
tion, or illness is manifest or active or when there is a distinct symptom or condition from
which one learned in medicine can with reasonable accuracy diagnose the disease."); see
also Hughes v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 264,269 (1st Cir. 1994) (interpreting pre-
existing condition clause in a disability insurance policy).
56. See, e.g., Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 171 N.E. 914, 915 (N.Y. 1930)
(Cardozo, C.i.) ("[A] condition abnormal or unsound when tested by a standard of perfec-
tion, yet so remote in its potential mischief that common speech would call it not disease
or infirmity, [is] at most a predisposing tendency."); J.A. Bryant, Jr., Annotation, What
Conditions Constitute "Disease" Within Terms of Life, Accident, Disability, or Hospitaliza-
tion Insurance Policy, 61 A.L.R.3d 822 (1975 & Supp. 1998); Cristine Nardi, Comment,
When Health Insurers Deny Coverage for Breast Reconstructive Surgery: Gender Meets
Disability, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 777.
57. See Katskee v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 515 N.W.2d 645,651-53 (Neb. 1994).
58. See id. at 652 ("Although appellant's condition was not detectable by physical evi-
dence or a physical examination, it does not necessarily follow that appellant does not suf-
fer from an illness."); see also id. ("We are mindful that not every condition which itself
constitutes a predisposition to another illness is necessarily an illness within the meaning
of an insurance policy."); Cheney v. Bell Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 556 A.2d 1135, 1138-40 (Md.
1989) (concluding that hemophilia is a "disease" rather than a genetic trait).
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one of these cancers. 59 As genetic screening becomes more sophisti-
cated in the future, issues of this sort will become even more compli-
cated, 60 especially if insurers attempt to turn the tables on patients
with a previously identified predisposition to a certain disease by de-
nying coverage for the treatment of the actual manifestation of that
disease as a pre-existing condition.
Even when an insured individual has clearly manifested a medi-
cally treatable condition, coverage may still depend on whether cer-
tain physical traits are somehow considered dysfunctional.61 For in-
stance, courts have struggled with insurers' arguments that infertility
treatments are not covered by policies that reimburse expenses for
treating an "illness." 62 Similar questions have arisen more recently
59. See Katskee, 515 N.W.2d at 651-52 (adding that this significant risk would itself
cause present "anxiety and stress"). The disaggregated probabilities that the plaintiff
would develop ovarian cancer or breast cancer apparently were less than 50%. See id;
Andrea Eisen & Barbara L. Weber, Editorial, Prophylactic Mastectomy-The Price of
Fear, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 137 (1999). Only by cumulating the two risks into a single
syndrome did the probability surpass that threshold, but the radical prophylactic surgery
only avoided ovarian cancer. It may well have been appropriate even though ovarian can-
cer alone was less probable than not, but the court should not have cloaked its deference
to the medical judgment by reference to an exaggerated probability. Cf. Alexandra K.
Glazier, Genetic Predispositions, Prophylactic Treatments and Private Health Insurance:
Nothing Is Better Than a Good Pair of Genes, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 45, 67-68 (1997) (ar-
guing that insurers should cover treatments for patients with a genetic defect and a greater
than 50% current risk of developing a serious disease).
60. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics,
45 VAND. L. REv. 313, 318 (1992) (noting that "expectations about the predictive possi-
bilities of genetic tests have created a new category of person-the presymptomatically
ill"); Ruth Hubbard, Predictive Genetics and the Construction of the Healthy Ill, 27
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1209, 1221 (1993) ("[G]enetic predictions of ill health create a new
class of 'patients' who are coming to be referred to as the asymptomatic or healthy ill:
people who have no symptoms, but are predicted to develop them at some undefined time
in the future."); see also DOROTHY NELKIN & LAURENCE TANCREDI, DANGEROUS
DIAGNOSTICS: THE SOCIAL POWER OF BIOLOGICAL INFORMATION (2d ed. 1994); John
A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REv. 421, 432-34
(1996).
61. See Michael H. Shapiro, The Technology of Perfection: Performance Enhancement
and the Control of Attributes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 11, 48-51 (1991) (distinguishing en-
hancements from treatments for disorder). For example, controversy has emerged over
the use of human growth hormone in normal children of short stature. See Committee on
Drugs and Committee on Bioethics, American Academy of Pediatrics, Considerations
Related to the Use of Recombinant Human Growth Hormone in Children, 99 PEDIATRICS
122, 125-26 (1997); Patricia McLaughlin, If Shortness Isn't a Disease, Why Are We Testing
a Cure?, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 1, 1993, at 3; see also Alice Dreger, When Medicine Goes
Too Far in the Pursuit of Normality, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1998, at F4 ("Instead of con-
stantly enhancing the norm-forever upping the ante of the 'normal' with new technolo-
gies-we should work on enhancing the concept of normal by broadening appreciation of
anatomical variation.").
62. See Egert v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 900 F.2d 1032, 1037-38 (7th Cir. 1990)
(covered); Witcraft v. Sundstrand Health & Disability Group Benefit Plan, 420 N.W.2d
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over insurance coverage for the anti-impotence drug sildenafil citrate
(Viagra®).63 In addition, in the early 1980s, the American Society of
Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons argued that small breasts should
be diagnosed as "micromastia," a physical deformity that could be
"treated" with silicone-gel implants.64 Although each of these exam-
ples poses coverage questions of differing complexity, they demon-
strate how disputes about health insurance policies' references to dis-
ease or dysfunction may turn on controversial medical judgments that
in turn may have been influenced by non-therapeutic considerations.
B. Federal Regulatory Agencies
Federal agencies make numerous decisions that depend on how
one defines a disease. For example, the status of a health condition as
a disease potentially affects a number of regulatory decisions by the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). First, the classification
of a product may depend on whether its intended use involves the
treatment of a disease.65 Drugs and medical devices face stiffer regu-
785, 788-90 (Iowa 1988) (same); Ralston v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 617 So. 2d
1379, 1381-82 (La. Ct. App.) (same), rev'd in part on other grounds, 625 So. 2d 156 (La. Ct.
App. 1993); Kinzie v. Physician's Liab. Ins. Co., 750 P.2d 1140, 1142 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987)
(not covered); see also Pamela J. Prager, Infertility: The Unrecognized Illness in the Health
Insurance Industry, 39 DRAKE L. REV. 617, 617 (1989-1990) ("Infertility can be a devas-
tating illness, yet insurance companies generally refuse to pay for the treatment of this dis-
ease."); Edward L. Raymond, Jr., Annotation, Coverage of Artificial Insemination Proce-
dures or Other Infertility Treatments by Health, Sickness, or Hospitalization Insurance, 80
A.L.R.4th 1059 (1990 & Supp. 1998).
63. See Victoria Slind-Flor & Bob Van Voris, Viagra May Have Legal Downside: Next
Fen-Phen?, NAT'L L.J., May 18, 1998, at Al; Milt Freudenheim, Many Insurers Are De-
ciding Not to Cover Cost of Viagra, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1998, at A6 ("The drug has been
promoted as an important enhancement to the quality of life for many older men and their
wives, but some health economists have raised questions about the medical necessity of a
treatment for impotene .... ."); Laurie McGinley, Medicaid Programs Are Told to Pay for
Viagra but Monitoring Continues, WALL ST. J., July 2, 1998, at B5; Robert Pear, White
House Plans Medicaid Coverage of Viagra by States, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1998, at Al
(According to one HHS official, "'if Viagra is determined by a doctor to be medically nec-
essary, Medicaid should pay for it."').
64. See BARBARA EHRENREICH, THE SNARLING CITIZEN 56-59 (1995); ELIZABETH
HAIKEN, VENUS ENVY: A HISTORY OF COSMETIC SURGERY 271 (1997); Jan Gehorsam,
Women Feeling Pressured to Sculpt a Perfect Body: Implants a Response to Cultural Mes-
sage, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 29,1992, at Al.
65. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(B) (1994) (defining the term "drug" in part as "articles
intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease");
id. § 321(h)(2) (defining the term "medical device" in a similar fashion); see also Lars
Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Nicotine Withdrawak Assessing the FDA's Effort to Regulate
Tobacco Products, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1996) ("In the past, the FDA has asserted
[drug] jurisdiction over tobacco products only when they were accompanied by therapeu-
tic claims."); Gary E. Gamerman, Note, Intended Use and Medical Devices: Distinguishing
Nonmedical "Devices" from Medical "Devices" Under 21 U.S.C. § 321(h), 61 GEO. WASH.
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latory requirements than do food products and cosmetics. Second, in
the case of food products, the FDA has authorized the use of health
claims in labeling only for a limited class of disease-prevention state-
ments.66 The FDA would not allow such a labeling claim for a nutri-
ent positively associated with a health condition that was not re-
garded as either a disease or a recognized risk factor.
Third, in the case of drugs, the nature of the targeted condition
might affect the availability of special review provisions. For in-
stance, accelerated approval is available for certain drugs and biol-
ogics that are intended for use "in treating serious or life-threatening
illnesses and that provide meaningful therapeutic benefit to patients
over existing treatments." 67 The FDA will accept evidence of drug
effectiveness in attaining surrogate markers or endpoints (such as re-
ductions in CD4 cell counts) in lieu of more difficult to prove clinical
endpoints (such as reductions in disease morbidity or mortality).
68
Even if they are not eligible for accelerated approval, new drugs to
treat diseases for which no effective pharmaceutical therapies cur-
L. REV. 806, 850 (1993) (explaining that courts "have restricted the [FDA's] medical de-
vice jurisdiction to products bearing claims of therapeutic use or effect").
66. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(3)(B) (1994) (calling for the promulgation of regulations to
authorize labeling claims about the relationship between a nutrient and a "disease or
health-related condition"); 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(a)(6) (1998) ("Disease or health-related
condition means damage to an organ, part, structure, or system of the body such that it
does not function properly (e.g., cardiovascular disease), or a state of health leading to
such dysfunctioning (e.g., hypertension)."); id. § 101.72-81 (approving health claims for
certain nutrients associated with the prevention of osteoporosis, cancer, hypertension,
coronary heart disease, neural tube defects, and dental caries); see also 58 Fed. Reg. 2478,
2481 (1993) ("Congress intended that claims about conditions other than diseases be
regulated .... [C]laims about risk factors related to disease, as well as claims about a dis-
ease, can be health claims."). For a summary of these restrictions, see Lars Noah & Bar-
bara A. Noah, Liberating Commercial Speech Product Labeling Controls and the First
Amendment, 47 FLA. L. REV. 63,67-70 (1995).
More recently, in the course of implementing statutory amendments that liberalize re-
strictions on the labeling of dietary supplements, see 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6), the FDA pro-
posed rules designed to broaden the definition of the term "disease," arguably in an effort
to limit the effect of the statutory amendments. See Regulations on Statements Made for
Dietary Supplements Concerning the Effect of the Product on the Structure or Function
of the Body, 63 Fed. Reg. 23,624, 23,626, 23,631-32 (1998) (amending 21 C.F.R.
§ 101.14(a)(6)) (proposed Apr. 29, 1998); David Brown, New FDA Commissioner Enters
War over Words, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1999, at A31 (describing congressional hearing
that focused on the Agency's proposed new definition of "disease").
67. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.500, 601.40 (1998); see also id. § 312.34(b) (defining "serious" and
"immediately life-threatening"); 57 Fed. Reg. 58,942, 58,945-46 (1992) (responding to ob-
jections that this category was vague).
68. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.510, 601.41; 57 Fed. Reg. at 58,944; see also FDA Moderniza-
tion Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 112, 111 Stat. 2296, 2309-10 (to be codified at 21
U.S.C. § 356) (codifying these special procedures for "fast track" approvals). The appli-
cant generally must conduct postmarketing studies relating to the product's effectiveness
in achieving the clinical endpoints presumably associated with the surrogate markers.
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rently exist receive priority status by FDA reviewers. 69 In addition,
products intended to treat a rare disease or condition may qualify for
"orphan drug" designation, which entitles the sponsor to certain spe-
cial research and development incentives.70
Finally, and most important, the FDA's decision to approve a
new drug or other medical product will entail a risk-benefit calcula-
tion,71 so the perceived importance of the therapeutic benefit natu-
rally will influence the Agency's licensing judgments. In this manner,
the FDA takes into account the significance of a targeted health con-
dition, or the status of that condition as a treatable disease, when
making product approval decisions. Moreover, even if a drug's bene-
fits outweigh its potential risks, the Agency may demand prescription
status if labeling cannot be designed to allow consumers to engage in
safe self-diagnosis and treatment.72
69. See Bruce N. Kuhlik, Industry Funding of Improvements in the FDA's New Drug
Approval Process: The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, 47 FOOD & DRUG LJ.
483,501 n.101 (1992).
70. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a) (1994) (allowing special designation of a drug intended to
treat "a rare disease or condition," defined as affecting less than 200,000 persons in the
United States or for which there is no reasonable expectation of recovering research and
development costs).
For the purpose of documenting that the number of people affected by the dis-
ease or condition for which the drug product is indicated is less than 200,000 per-
sons, "prevalence" is defined as the number of persons in the United States who
have been diagnosed as having the disease or condition at the time of the submis-
sion of the request for orphan-drug designation.
21 C.F.R. § 316.21(b) (1998); see 57 Fed. Reg. 62,076, 62,081 (1992) ("FDA has no way of
determining the likely treatment population other than by relying on current diagnostic
methods and treatment attitudes."); see also 21 C.F.R. § 316.20(b)(6) ("Where a drug is
under development for only a subset of persons with a particular disease or condition, [a
sponsor shall provide] a demonstration that the subset is medically plausible."); 57 Fed.
Reg. at 62,081 ("FDA declines to provide examples of medical plausibility [of a subset of
patients] or to further develop the definition of this term. Application of the concept is a
matter of judgment based on the specific facts of each case."); David B. Clissold, Prescrip-
tion for the Orphan Drug Act" The Impact of the FDA's 1992 Regulations and the Latest
Congressional Proposals for Reform, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 125, 133-37 (1995) (discussing
these issues).
71. See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical
Products, 82 VA. L. REv. 1753, 1765 n.37 (1996) ("The central question became whether
the known risks of a drug were outweighed by its demonstrated clinical utility.").
72. See 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(B) (1994). A number of reasons may exist for prescrip-
tion labeling, such as the difficulty with self-diagnosis, a product's margin of safety, and
the extent to which dosages need to be carefully titrated for each patient. See id. (provid-
ing that a drug which, "because of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful effect, or
the method of its use, or the collateral measures necessary to its use, is not safe for use ex-
cept under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug...
shall be dispensed only" upon a prescription); 21 C.F.R. § 330.10(a)(4)(vi) (1998) (same);
Peter Barton Hutt, A Legal Framework for Future Decisions on Transferring Drugs from
Prescription to Nonprescription Status, 37 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 427,433-39 (1982).
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Asymptomatic conditions may pose difficult questions for the
FDA when it reviews new drugs intended to manage these conditions.
An asymptomatic condition does not really qualify as an "illness" be-
cause the patient cannot perceive any complaints, though it may still
represent a disease condition detected by a physician. For example,
hypertension, hypercholesterolemia, and hyperlipidemia generally do
not manifest symptoms, but they are viewed as risk-factors in coro-
nary heart disease and stroke. As previously mentioned, barring eli-
gibility for accelerated approval, the Agency usually demands that an
applicant demonstrate a drug's effectiveness in achieving clinical end-
points rather than surrogate markers associated with those clinical
endpoints. By reconceptualizing hypertension as a freestanding dis-
ease entity, however, a pharmaceutical manufacturer would only have
to demonstrate that its new drug product effectively reduced blood
pressure without also having to show that this resulted in reduced
morbidity or mortality.73 Classifying asymptomatic conditions as dis-
eases may, however, also undermine the prospects for approval of a
drug whose side effects include one of these conditions-for instance,
a drug intended to treat some other condition may fare less well in
the Agency's risk-benefit calculus if it causes the "disease" of hyper-
tension than if it merely causes elevated blood pressure.
The status of obesity as a condition or a disease has been a recur-
rent issue for the FDA. In approving the fat-substitute olestra, the
Agency noted that it had received several comments supporting this
novel food additive as a useful response to the adverse health effects
of obesity.74 The FDA also has approved prescription weight loss
drugs in recent years based in part on the assumption that obesity
represents a disease.75 Indeed, historically, the FDA did not regard
73. Cf. ARONOWITZ, supra note 32, at 127 ("Risk factors have been defined and
treated as if they were straightforward diseases. This has been especially true of hyperten-
sion and hypercholesterolemia."); id. at 127-28 (noting that pharmaceutical companies
helped launch a campaign to promote hypercholesterolemia screening and treatment,
adding that, "for the physician, the carrot in the national cholesterol campaigns was the
creation of new reimbursable medical diagnoses"); id. at 246 n.20 ("Defining blood pres-
sure above 140/90 as a disease, for example, results in a large market for antihypertensive
medications and an imperative for costly screening campaigns."); Denise Grady, As Silent
Killer Returns, Doctors Rethink Tactics to Lower Blood Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, July 14,
1998, at F1 (reporting that "it is not known whether all drugs that lower blood pressure
also protect against heart attack and stroke," adding that "[d]rug companies sold about $9
billion in blood pressure medications in 1997").
74. See 61 Fed. Reg. 3118, 3163 (1996). In approving food additives, however, the
FDA may not take purported benefits into account. See id. at 3166; see also Lars Noah &
Richard A. Merrill, Starting from Scratch?: Reinventing the Food Additive Approval Proc-
ess, 78 B.U. L. REV. 329,392-94 (1998).
75. See Laura Johannes & Steve Stecklow, Dire Warnings About Obesity Rely on Slip-
pery Statistic, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9,1998, at B1 ("[T]he FDA's bar for approving new drugs
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obesity as a disease, leading Congress to expand the drug definition
so that the Agency could assert its regulatory authority over weight
loss products.76 Although obese individuals face a variety of health
problems,77 some scientists regard most types of obesity as a symptom
of one among several possible underlying disorders rather than a dis-
ease process itself.78 If only regarded as a symptom, proposed new
obesity treatments will fare less well in the Agency's risk-benefit cal-
culus and product approval decisions in the future.
Other federal agencies make decisions that depend on, and in
turn influence, how one defines diseases. The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) play an important role in both defin-
ing and tracking emerging, usually infectious diseases such as AIDS.79
is lower for disease treatments than for other problems, such as baldness or skin wrinkles.
The agency is less likely to approve a drug for a nondisease condition when it is shown to
have serious side effects-such as those that diet drugs produce."); see also Richard L. At-
kinson, Proposed Standards for Judging the Success of the Treatment of Obesity, 119
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 677, 679 (1993); Arthur Frank, Futility and Avoidance: Medical
Professionals in the Treatment of Obesity, 269 JAMA 2132,2132-33 (1993) (supporting the
characterization of obesity as a disease); Marlene Cimons, Public Is Urged to Treat Obesity
as Chronic Disease, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6,1994, at A14.
76. See Hearings on S. 2800 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 73d Cong. 516
(1934) (statement of W.G. Campbell, Chief of FDA); E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Bowen,
870 F.2d 678, 682-83 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
77. See, e.g., Steven L. Gortmaker et al., Social and Economic Consequences of Over-
weight in Adolescence and Young Adulthood, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1008, 1008 (1993)
(noting the "[n]umerous health risks" now associated with obesity); F. Xavier Pi-Sunyer,
Medical Hazards of Obesity, 119 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 655, 655-58 (1993). "Obese"
means more than 20% over a person's ideal body weight. See THE MERCK MANUAL OF
DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 981 (Robert Berkow et al. eds., 16th ed. 1992) (conceding that
this threshold is arbitrary). Another standard calculates a person's body-mass index
(BMI). See June Stevens et al., The Effect of Age on the Association Between Body-Mass
Index and Mortality, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 2 (1998); David F. Williamson, Descriptive
Epidemiology of Body Weight and Weight Change in U.S. Adults, 119 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 646, 646 (1993); Jane E. Brody, New Guide Puts Most Americans on the Fat Side,
N.Y. TIMES, June 9,1998, at F7.
78. See, e.g., Jerome P. Kassirer & Marcia Angell, Editorial, Losing Weight-An Ill-
Fated New Year's Resolution, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 52, 53 (1998) (criticizing efforts to
label obesity as a disease).
79. See ELIZABETH W. ETHERIDGE, SENTINEL FOR HEALTH: A HISTORY OF THE
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL 341-43 (1992) (describing the CDC's success in track-
ing mysterious disease outbreaks such as Legionnaires' disease, toxic shock syndrome, and
AIDS); see also CDC, Summary of Notifiable Diseases, United States, 1996,45 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. No. 53, Oct. 31, 1997, at 1. As the agency explained, how-
ever, its case definitions "establish uniform criteria for disease reporting and should not be
used as the sole criteria for establishing clinical diagnoses... or providing standards for
reimbursement." CDC, Case Definitions for Infectious Conditions Under Public Health
Surveillance, 46 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. No. RR-10 (May 2, 1997), at 3.
The World Health Organization's ICD also was designed for this more limited purpose.
See 2 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF
DISEASES AND RELATED HEALTH PROBLEMS 2 (10th rev. ed. 1993).
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In concert with the FDA, the CDC's assessment of side effects has
helped turn up previously undescribed or poorly understood diseases
associated with widely used products.8 0 Finally, the National Insti-
tutes of Health (NIH) fund basic research proposals depending in
part on the class of diseases targeted by the grant application.8' By
sponsoring, conducting, and reviewing biomedical research, these
three bureaucracies directly influence, and in turn are influenced by,
new developments in nosology.
C. Tort Plaintiffs
In tort litigation, plaintiffs must prove that some act or omission
by the defendant caused a compensable injury. Disputes about medi-
cal testimony typically involve causation questions, where no one
doubts that the plaintiff has some "injury," but its association with the
defendant's allegedly tortious conduct remains obscure. Questions
about causation have become particularly difficult for courts to re-
solve in cases where the plaintiff contracts a long latency disease such
as cancer,82 and the United States Supreme Court has instructed trial
judges to engage in more careful scrutiny of expert scientific evidence
80. See 53 Fed. Reg. 21,633, 21,637 (1988) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 201.314(h) (1998))
(requiring a warning of the association between Reye syndrome and aspirin use in chil-
dren); 47 Fed. Reg. 26,982, 26,989-90 (1982) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 801.430 (1998)) (re-
quiring a warning of the association between toxic shock syndrome (TSS) and tampons).
For a more detailed discussion of these two cases, see Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn:
Disentangling the "Right to Know" from the "Need to Know" About Consumer Product
Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293,323-24 & n.133 (1994).
81. See EDWARD H. AHRENS, JR., THE CRISIS IN CLINICAL RESEARCH:
OVERCOMING INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES 65-105 (1992) (describing the NIH's disease-
oriented structure and process of awarding extramural research grants); INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, FUNDING HEALTH SCIENCES RESEARCH 37 (1990) (noting that Congress
"added numerous categorical institutes to NIH [since World War II], reflecting efforts of
special interest groups to target research on specific organ groups and illnesses"). This
happens because federal legislators may earmark appropriations for particular diseases, as
happened with the "war on cancer" initiated in the early 1970s. See VICTORIA A.
HARDEN, INVENTING THE NIH: FEDERAL BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH POLICY, 1887-1937,
at 186 (1986); see also Robert Pear, Health Agency Urged to Review Spending, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 1998, at A24 (describing a report issued by the Institute of Medicine rec-
ommending that NIH "should more systematically consider data on the prevalence, death
rates and costs of different diseases in setting its research agenda and priorities," in part to
combat the perception that patient advocacy groups unduly influence the process).
82. See Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific
Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469, 501-22 (1988);
Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1, 31-33 (1995); Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in
the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 12-17 (1993); see also JANE STAPLETON,
DISEASE AND THE COMPENSATION DEBATE 3 (1986) (arguing that the tort system, de-
signed to compensate accident victims for traumatic injuries, is ill-suited to deal with
claims involving diseases).
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in such situations.8 3
Disputes about medical causation typically pose scientific (usu-
ally epidemiological) questions subject to these strictures,84 but courts
tend to review diagnostic (clinical) judgments about the nature of par-
ticular patients' injuries under more forgiving standards. As one fed-
eral court recently explained:
Because the objectives, functions, subject matter and methodology
of hard science vary significantly from those of the discipline of
clinical medicine, as distinguished from research or laboratory
medicine, the hard science techniques or methods that became the
"Daubert factors" generally are not appropriate for assessing the
evidentiary reliability of a proffer of expert clinical medical testi-
mony.8
5
The judgments of treating physicians are given particular deference
even though they may have little expertise on scientific questions of
general causation.8 6 In effect, courts allow them to testify about ulti-
mate issues such as the nature of the plaintiffs damages.87
83. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512,519 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 583-94 (1993); see also KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W.
HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS
(1997); Symposium, Scientific Evidence After the Death of Frye: Daubert and Its Implica-
tions for Toxic Torts, Pharmaceutica4 and Products Liability Cases, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
1745 (1994); Judith A. Hasko, Note, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Flexi-
ble Judicial Screening of Scientific Expert Evidence Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
1995 Wis. L. REv. 479,495-505.
84. See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Torts, Causation, and Scientific Evidence After
Daubert, 55 U. PITr. L. REv. 889, 895-903 (1994); Joseph Sanders, Scientific Validity, Ad-
missibility, and Mass Torts After Daubert, 78 MINN. L. REv. 1387, 1406-17 (1994).
85. Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 33501, at *23 (5th Cir.
1997), vacated, 151 F.3d 269,275 n.6 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (rejecting any such distinc-
tion); see also id. at *22-28, 73-80; id. at *104-09 (Davis, J., dissenting) (distinguishing be-
tween the testimony of physicians concerning (1) diagnostic judgments and (2) medical
causation, which is subject to Daubert); David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball
at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Wor-
rying About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1799, 1832 (1994) (ar-
guing that courts inappropriately may fail to apply Daubert to "clinical judgments"); cf.
Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1174-79 (1999) (holding Daubert applicable to
expert testimony from an engineer that was based on his experience and observation
rather than scientific research). In medical malpractice cases, of course, physicians may
testify as experts on questions about the standard of care and breach. See Karyn K. Ablin,
Note, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Expert Opinion Evidence in Medical Malpractice Cases:
Strange Bedfellows, 82 VA. L. REV. 325,337 (1996).
86. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 552 F. Supp. 1293, 1300 (D.D.C. 1982) (cred-
iting the testimony of the plaintiff's "treating physicians, a qualification shared by none of
the defendant's experts"), aff'd, 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Iorio v. Grossie, 663 So.
2d 366, 368-69 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
87. See FED. R. EVID. 704(a) ("[T]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be de-
cided by the trier of fact."); Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 922 F.2d 1357, 1361 (8th
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Even in uncomplicated tort cases, of course, treating physicians
must testify about the nature and extent of a patient's injury.
88
(Similarly, on the assumption of the special trustworthiness of infor-
mation communicated in this context, the hearsay rule includes an ex-
ception covering statements by patients "made for purposes of medi-
cal diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or
present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general
character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment."89) The point at which an illness
becomes medically diagnosable may also help define when the statute
of limitations will start running on long-latency disease claims. 90 In
some cases, however, it may be unclear whether the plaintiff has any
injury whatsoever, collapsing the causation inquiry into questions
about the appropriate definition of the asserted injury.
For instance, definitions of occupational diseases may explicitly
incorporate the agent suspected of causing serious respiratory symp-
toms, such as silicosis, byssinosis, black lung disease, and asbestosis. 91
Cir. 1990); Kathy Jo Cook, An Opinion: Federal Judges Misconstrue Rule 704. (Or Is That
an Impermissible "Legal" Conclusion?), 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 45 (1995).
88. See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1119; Jeff L.
Lewin, The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Uncertainty About "Reasonable Medical Cer-
tainty," 57 MD. L. REV. 380, 382-83 (1998) ("Physicians provide essential opinion testi-
mony on the issues of causation and damages in virtually all civil actions for wrongful
death or personal injury [as well as in workers' compensation cases] .... In all such pro-
ceedings, the outcome may hinge on the willingness of a physician to express an opinion
with 'reasonable medical certainty."' (footnotes omitted)); DePass v. United States, 721
F.2d 203, 209 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting) ("[A] tort plaintiff's burden of proving
the extent of his injury is not a heavy one. Doubts are resolved against the tortfeasor.").
89. FED. R. EVID. 803(4); see also Galindo v. United States, 630 A.2d 202, 210 (D.C.
1993); L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witnesses Under Rules 703 and 803(4) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence: Separating the Wheat from the Chaff, 72 IND. L.J. 939, 947, 996-97
(1997) (criticizing this exception for covering statements made in the course of seeking a
professional medical diagnosis for purposes other than treatment). See generally ELLIOTr
B. OPPENHEIM, THE MEDICAL RECORD AS EVIDENCE (1998).
90. See, e.g., Benne v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 87 F.3d 419, 427-28 (10th Cir.
1996); Neubauer v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 686 F.2d 570, 573-77 (7th Cir. 1982);
In re FELA Asbestos Cases, 646 F. Supp. 610, 613 (W.D. Va. 1985); In re New York
County DES Litig., 678 N.E.2d 474, 478 (N.Y. 1997); see also Marinari v. Asbestos Corp.,
612 A.2d 1021, 1022 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) ("Plaintiffs discovery of a nonmalignant, asbes-
tos related lung pathology, whether or not accompanied by clinical symptoms of impaired
pulmonary function, does not trigger the statute of limitations with respect to an action for
a later, separately diagnosed, disease of lung cancer."); Michael D. Green, The Paradox of
Statutes of Limitations in Toxic Substances Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REv. 965, 973-76 (1988).
91. See Gerald Markowitz & David Rosner, The Illusion of Medical Certainty: Silicosis
and the Politics of Industrial Disability, 1930-1960, in FRAMING DISEASE: STUDIES IN
CULTURAL HISTORY, supra note 33, at 185, 202; see also Frank Davidoff, Editorial, New
Disease, Old Story, 129 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 327 (1998) (discussing the publication
of, and controversy surrounding, a new study describing "flock worker's lung" in the nylon
manufacturing industry). In applying the Black Lung Benefits Act, courts have recognized a
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Asymptomatic plaintiffs may try to recast their enhanced future risk
of injury as a presently diagnosed syndrome, whether physical or
mental,92 much like the patient suffering from "breast-ovarian carci-
noma syndrome" who eventually succeeded in obtaining reimburse-
ment from her health insurer for prophylactic surgery.93 In some of
these cases, the availability of compensation turns on whether the
plaintiff can demonstrate some type of subcellular damage.94
A number of tort plaintiffs have alleged suffering from multiple
chemical sensitivity syndrome (MCS).95 According to the "clinical
distinction between the medical and legal definitions of the disease pneumoconiosis. See, eg.,
Richardson v. Director, OWCP, 94 F.3d 164,166 n.2 (4th Cir. 1996); Nance v. Benefits Review
Bd., 861 F.2d 68,71 (4th Cir. 1988).
92. See David Carl Minneman, Annotation, Future Disease or Condition, or Anxiety
Relating Thereto, As Element of Recovery, 50 A.L.R.4th 13, 49 (1986) ("[1It may be possi-
ble to recover substantial damages by stressing the objective symptoms of an injured per-
son's present condition rather than attempting to prove damages for a future disease or
condition."); see also Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 428-38
(1997) (retaining physical-impact rule for emotional distress claims in FELA actions, and
denying recovery to railroad worker exposed to asbestos but not yet suffering any illness);
Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 804-16 (Cal. 1993) (allowing fear of
cancer claim if toxic exposure will more likely than not lead to cancer); Eagle-Picher In-
dus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (rejecting enhanced future
risk claim where plaintiff suffered from asbestosis, noting that "asbestosis and cancer are
distinct and separate diseases"); Mauro v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 561 A.2d 257,264-67 (NJ.
1989) (holding that enhanced future risk claims are only available if the development of
cancer is a reasonable medical probability); Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232, 237-39
(Pa. 1996) (concluding that "asymptomatic pleural thickening is not a compensable injury
which gives rise to a cause of action" and also cannot support an emotional distress claim
for fear of developing cancer); Bill Charles Wells, The Grin Without the Cat: Claims for
Damages from Toxic Exposure Without Present Injury, 18 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L. 285,
319-29 (1994); Glen Donath, Comment, Curing Cancerphobia Phobia: Reasonableness
Redefined, 62 U. CmI. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (1995) (distinguishing between enhanced future
risk claims and emotional distress claims, which are a present injury based on a reaction to
that future risk); Note, Latent Harms and Risk-Based Damages, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1505,
1506 (1998) ("[A]dvances in the understanding of disease have led to the recognition of
'latent harms'-harms that may not develop into symptomatic disease for significant peri-
ods of time.").
93. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
94. See Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 17-18 (D. Colo. 1984) (re-
quiring only proof of damage to "cellular and subcellular structures" from radiation expo-
sure); cf. Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1227-32 (D. Mass. 1986) (al-
lowing emotional distress but not enhanced future risk claim based on subcellular harm
and immune system impairment). But cf. Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d
936, 942 (3d Cir. 1985) (rejecting enhanced future risk claim where plaintiff only had "sub-
clinical injury" from asbestos exposure).
95. See Jack W. Synder et al., Injury and Causation on Triak The Phenomenon of
"Multiple Chemical Sensitivities," 2 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 97, 102 (1997) ("[T]he phe-
nomenon of MCS does not represent a diagnosis, disease, or illness as defined by orthodox
medical practitioners. Importantly, the proposed definitions of MCS do not require the
specificity of complaints necessary to qualify MCS as an objectively verifiable medical
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ecologists" who popularized this diagnosis, MCS patients have be-
come so sensitized to chemicals from prior low-level environmental
exposures that they develop a variety of vague symptoms upon any
subsequent exposure. 96 Although several researchers defend MCS as
a valid diagnostic entity,97 the mainstream biomedical research com-
munity remains skeptical that this condition represents any sort of
genuine physical illness. 98 So far, courts have rejected testimony di-
agnosing plaintiffs with multiple chemical sensitivity.99 As one court
noted, there is "'considerable doubt in the scientific medical commu-
nity regarding the legitimacy of MCS as a valid nosologic/diagnostic
entity."' 00 If courts began to accept MCS diagnoses from clinical
ecologists, defendants would have no genuine opportunity to dispute
syndrome." (footnote omitted)).
96. See Wendi J. Berkowitz, Multiple Chemical Sensibility in the Courtroom: Is There
Life After Daubert?, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 483,487-89 (1996) (describing the "hodgepodge of
symptoms that clinical ecologists believe may characterize MCS. Almost every abnormal
body function, ache or pain appears in the literature as a possible symptom," adding that
clinical ecologists have conceded that they do not know the etiology of MCS but "are sat-
isfied with attributing causation to almost everything in the environment"); Steven H.
Winterbauer, Multiple Chemical Sensitivity and the ADA: Taking a Clear Picture of a
Blurry Object, 23 EMPLOYEE RELS. LJ. 69,75 (1997) ("[Critics] view MCS as a diagnosis
of default, a catch-all label that is overused when the attending medical professional is in-
capable of readily fitting the claimed symptoms within the definition of other established
diagnoses.").
97. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MULTIPLE CHEMICAL SENSITIVITIES:
ADDENDUM TO BIOLOGIC MARKERS IN IMMUNOTOXICOLOGY (1992); Alvin C. Bron-
stein, Multiple Chemical Sensitivities-New Paradigm Needed, 33 J. TOXICOLOGY 93
(1995); Mark R. Cullen, The Worker with Multiple Chemical Sensitivities: An Overview, 2
STATE OF THE ART REVIEWS: OCCUPATIONAL MED. 655 (1987); Ann L. Davidoff &
Linda Fogarty, Psychogenic Origins of Multiple Chemical Sensitivities Syndrome: A Criti-
cal Review of the Research Literature, 49 ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH 316 (1994); Claudia
S. Miller, Chemical Sensitivity: History and Phenomenology, 10 TOXICOLOGY & INDUS.
HEALTH 253 (1994); Patricia J. Sparks et al., Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Syndrome: A
Clinical Perspective, 36 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 718 (1994) (summarizing the debate).
98. See, e.g., American College of Physicians, Clinical Ecology, 111 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 168 (1989); AMA Council on Scientific Affairs, Clinical Ecology, 268
JAMA 3465, 3467 (1992) (concluding that "multiple chemical sensitivity should not be
considered a recognized clinical syndrome"); Thomas L. Kurt, Multiple Chemical Sensi-
tivities-A Syndrome of Pseudotoxicity Manifest as Exposure Perceived Symptoms, 33 J.
TOXICOLOGY 101 (1995); Abba I. Terr, Editorial, Multiple Chemical Sensitivities, 119
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 163 (1993).
99. See, e.g., Bradley v. Brown, 42 F.3d 434, 438-39 (7th Cir. 1994); Summers v. Mis-
souri Pac. R.R. Sys., 897 F. Supp. 533, 535-40 (E.D. Okla. 1995); Carlin v. RFE Indus.,
Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19035, at *16-20 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1995); Graham v. Cana-
dian Nat'l Ry. Co., 749 F. Supp. 1300, 1310-11 (D. Vt. 1990); see also Sterling v. Velsicol
Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1208 (6th Cir. 1988) ("The leading professional societies in
the specialty of allergy and immunology. . . have rejected clinical ecology as an unproven
methodology lacking any scientific base in either fact or theory.").
100. Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756, 768 (E.D. Va. 1995) (quoting expert wit-
ness's report).
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that their alleged negligence actually caused the plaintiffs present
condition because an assumption of low-level, cumulative exposure to
some chemical is built into the diagnosis itself.
Plaintiffs also may rely on a diagnosis of "atypical" forms of a
disease when the available evidence of causation undermines asser-
tions that the defendant caused their particular injury. For instance,
in response to recent epidemiological studies finding no statistically
significant association between silicone-gel breast implants and previ-
ously described autoimmune diseases such as lupus,101 some plaintiffs'
attorneys and treating physicians retreated from the claim that their
clients had one of the traditional connective-tissue diseases and in-
stead asserted that they suffered from some atypical form of these
diseases. 02 Thus, rather than directly confront the defendant's causa-
tion evidence, plaintiffs have dodged that evidence through the sim-
ple expedient of effectively having their alleged injuries rediagnosed.
So far, courts have rebuffed such efforts.103
Psychiatric diagnoses have become increasingly important in civil
101. See Sherine E. Gabriel et al., Risk of Connective-Tissue Diseases and Other Disor-
ders After Breast Implantation, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1697, 1699-700 (1994); Jorge
Sdnchez-Guerrero et al., Silicone Breast Implants and the Risk of Connective-Tissue Dis-
eases and Symptoms, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1666, 1668-70 (1995); see also Gina Kolata,
In Implant Case, Science and Law Have Different Agendas, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1998, at
Al (summarizing the mounting evidence against any link to disease and the tactic by
plaintiffs' lawyers of recasting their clients' conditions as "atypical").
102. See, e.g., MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL
EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 97-108, 199 (1996) ("Doctors
who make their living diagnosing implant-related diseases and the lawyers who pay them
have every reason to postulate increasingly obscure syndromes, as the well-defined ones
come under scientific scrutiny."); see also ARONOWTZ, supra note 32, at 49 ("[T]he very
naming and rationalization of these advances as immunologic when the underlying patho-
physiological etiology in most of these disorders-including ulcerative colitis-is still
poorly understood suggests that larger social factors may be at work .... [W]e may have
substituted one large and malleable concept for another, autoimmunity for psychosomat-
ics, to explain the etiology of still poorly understood chronic illnesses."); cf. COLBY &
SPAR, supra note 21, at 15 (criticizing DSM-IIFs inclusion of "atypical" subcategories as
nothing more than a device to "reduc[e] the number of persons whose disorder cannot be
classified"); id. at 30 ("Under the 'atypical' subcategory of most of the major diagnoses,
you could place any person with any complaint that happens to contain emotional
terms."); GLENN, supra note 4, at 12 ("If the problem persists, perhaps a diagnosis may be
made of 'subacute' this or that,.., or that the patient suffers from 'diverticulosis' (a
wastebasket diagnosis in this case), or perhaps from a psychosomatic disorder, such as 'ir-
ritable bowel syndrome."').
103. See Kelley v. American Heyer-Schulte Corp., 957 F. Supp. 873, 877-80 & n.6 (W.D.
Tex. 1997); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1402 (D. Or. 1996); see
also John Schwartz, Scientists Find Little That Links Breast Implants and Disease, WASH.
POST, Dec. 2, 1998, at A8 (describing report issued by a court-appointed panel of experts).
But see Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 915-18 (Mass. 1998) (reject-
ing objections to the admission of such testimony).
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litigation as courts liberalize the rules for pain and suffering damages
and claims for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.104 For in-
stance, several courts have allowed tort plaintiffs to recover damages
based on a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).105 The
American Psychiatric Association first officially recognized this con-
dition in 1980,106 and it has gradually refined the definition.107 To the
extent that judges traditionally restricted emotional distress claims
lacking any physical trigger or manifestation out of a suspicion that
such injuries were too easily feigned, psychiatric testimony that the
plaintiff suffers from a diagnosable mental illness may provide some
reassurance of legitimacy. Nonetheless, some critics argue that a di-
agnosis of PTSD inappropriately certifies the genuineness of emo-
tional distress complaints asserted by tort plaintiffs. 0 8 It may be,
104. See, e.g., Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772-73 (Mo. 1983) (requiring that
emotional distress or mental injury be diagnosable and medically significant); Johnson v.
Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (N.C. 1990) (requiring "severe
mental distress" constituted by "any emotional or mental disorder, such as, for example,
neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia, or any other type of severe and disabling
emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by pro-
fessionals"); cf. Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 205 (Alaska 1995) ("While some juris-
dictions have required claims of emotional distress to be 'medically diagnosable or objecti-
fiable,' we do not believe that such a limitation is necessary or desirable." (footnote
omitted)); Julie A. Davies, Direct Actions for Emotional Harm: Is Compromise Possible?,
67 WASH. L. REv. 1, 25 (1992) ("Numerous commentators and courts have observed that
developments in science enable experts to adequately distinguish between trivial and non-
trivial emotional distress without reliance on physical consequences of harm."). It seems
unrealistic to think that jurisdictions demanding a diagnosis of a mental disorder will
screen out exaggerated claims of mental distress.
105. See, e.g., Gough v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 996 F.2d 763, 767 (5th Cir.
1993); Nichols v. Busse, 503 N.W.2d 173, 180 (Neb. 1993); Berthelot v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 623 So. 2d 14, 22 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Giamanco v. Epe, Inc., 619 So. 2d 842, 845-46
(La. Ct. App. 1993); Sullivan v. Boston Gas Co., 605 N.E.2d 805,811 (Mass. 1993); see also
ROBERT I. SIMON, POSTTRAuMATIC STRESS DISORDER IN LITIGATION: GUIDELINES
FOR FORENSIC ASSESSMENT 31 (1995) ("Because PTSD is incident specific, it has been a
favorite diagnosis in litigation because it creates a presumption of causation. When other
psychiatric disorders are diagnosed, legal causation may be much more difficult to
prove.").
106. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 236 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-HI]; Wilbur J. Scott, PTSD
in DSM-III: A Case in the Politics of Diagnosis and Disease, 37 SOC. PROBS. 294 (1990);
Lawrence Raiman, Problems of Diagnosis and Legal Causation in Courtroom Use of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder, 1 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 115,119-20 (1983).
107. See Richard L. Newman & Rachel Yehuda, PTSD in Civil Litigation: Recent Sci-
entific and Legal Developments, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 257, 262-65 (1997) (summarizing the
recognition and gradual evolution in the definition of PTSD, as well as recent research
suggesting that a diagnosis can be premised on measurable biochemical changes in a pa-
tient); John P. Wilson, The Historical Evolution of PTSD Diagnostic Criteria: From Freud
to DSM-IV, 7 J. TRAUMA STRESS 681 (1994).
108. See, e.g., James T. Brown, Compensation Neurosis Rides Again A Practitioner's
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however, that courts have accepted general evidence concerning
PTSD as a nosological entity to support a doctrinal expansion of emo-
tional distress claims, recognizing that stressful events can cause seri-
ous psychological injuries even without physical manifestations, in
which case the accuracy of individual diagnoses arguably becomes
less important.
D. Criminal Defendants
Psychiatric evidence has become a fairly common feature in
criminal litigation.1°9 In addition, civil commitment proceedings de-
pend on such information, though the Supreme Court recently ex-
plained that "we have traditionally left to legislators the task of de-
fining terms of a medical nature that have legal significance."" 0 As
one commentator previously had noted, "the legal system should not
be required to excuse or to commit a person just because mental
health professionals have labeled him 'sick.' An illness for mental
Guide to Defending PTSD Claims, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 467 (1996); Karl Kirkland, Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder vs. Pseudo Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: A Critical Distinc-
tion for Attorneys, 56 ALA. LAW. 90, 91-93 (1995); L.A. Neal, The Pitfalls of Making a
Categorical Diagnosis of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in Personal Injury Litigation, 34
MED. Sci. & L. 117 (1994); see also John A. Fairbank et al., Psychometric Detection of
Fabricated Symptoms of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 501, 501
(1985) ("Since [PTSD] is a disorder for which veterans can seek compensation and treat-
ment from the Veterans Administration, objective means of discriminating those veterans
who legitimately display its symptoms from those who intentionally simulate the symp-
toms are needed."); Stephen T. Perconte & Anthony J. Goreczny, Failure to Detect Fabri-
cated Posttraumatic Stress Disorder with the Use of the MMPI in a Clinical Population, 147
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1057, 1060 (1990) ("It may be that the most effective tools for de-
tecting fabricated symptoms of PTSD are those which verify and quantify combat expo-
sure, such as discharge papers, combat histories, and military records."). When civilians
sue, of course, no such means of checking the veracity of a PTSD diagnosis would exist.
109. See Richard J. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Profes-
sionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427,
466-67 (1980) ("Because the [criminal] law.., endorses a 'medical model' of abnormal
psychological functioning, courts have generally considered the presence of a diagnosable
mental illness to be a matter of some evidentiary importance."). Wholly apart from the
defendant's possible use of psychiatric evidence, the testimony of medical examiners about
the cause of victims' injuries or death may play a significant role in the success of criminal
prosecutions. Se4 eg., Mark Hansen, Why Are Iowa's Babies Dying?, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998, at
74 (describing recent controversy surrounding the use of "shaken baby syndrome" diagnoses
in prosecuting cases involving infant deaths).
110. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997) ("As a consequence, the States
have, over the years, developed numerous specialized terms to define mental health con-
cepts. Often, those definitions do not fit precisely with the definitions employed by the
medical community."); see also Steven I. Friedland, On Treatment, Punishment, and the
Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 73, 134-47 (1999); Gerard, supra
note 20, at 391 ("[M]any people in the legal system have fallen into the trap of assuming
that any condition that mental health professionals label as an illness must be accepted as
an illness for purposes of the mental health legal system.").
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health purposes need not be an illness for legal purposes." 1' None-
theless, if behavior does not qualify as a mental illness in the first
place, it will never count as a disease for legal purposes."
2
Even more so than other types of diseases, psychiatric conditions
have prompted significant controversy among medical profession-
als." 3 In an attempt to promote some consistency in the field, the
American Psychiatric Association (APA) has published and periodi-
cally revised its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM).14 Its latest edition, DSM-1V, appeared in 1994, and it now
lists hundreds of psychiatric ailments." 5 Diagnoses based on criteria
in the DSMs have become a central feature of litigation involving dis-
putes about mental illness.116
Many of the new psychiatric syndromes, such as battered woman
and rape trauma, represent variants of PTSD." 7 Other examples in-
111. Gerard, supra note 20, at 393.
112. See id. at 396 ("[E]very condition accepted as a mental illness by the legal system
must be classified as an illness by mental health professionals.").
113. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
114. For a description of the evolution of the DSMs, see STUART A. KIRK & HERB
KUTCHINS, THE SELLING OF DSM: THE RHETORIC OF SCIENCE IN PSYCHIATRY 27-28,
77-119, 139-40, 199-218 (1992) (detailing the drafting of DSM-III, including the decision to
drop homosexuality as a mental disorder, and the preparation of DSM-1V).
115. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]; see also HERB KUTCHINS
& STUART A. KIRK, MAKING Us CRAZY-DSM: THE PSYCHIATRIC BIBLE AND THE
CREATION OF MENTAL DISORDERS x (1997) (calling DSM-1V "the repository of a
strange mix of social values, political compromise, scientific evidence, and material for in-
surance claim forms").
116. See, e.g., State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 208 (N.M. 1993) (accepting PTSD testi-
mony on the strength of its inclusion in the DSM); Daniel W. Schuman, The Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in the Courts, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 25, 27 (1989) (describing the extensive forensic use of the DSM); see
also Gerard, supra note 20, at 413 ("The legal system cannot, independently of medicine,
establish criteria for the reliable diagnoses of any illness, mental or otherwise.... But the
legal system certainly can adopt the medical criteria for reliable diagnoses, and can insist
that they be adhered to in the legal processes."); Sabra McDonald Owens, Note, Diagnos-
tic Evidence Admissibility and the Multiple Personality Disorder Defense, 1 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL'Y 236 (1998).
117. See State v. Janes, 850 P.2d 495, 502 (Wash. 1993) (describing battered woman
syndrome and battered child syndrome as "abuse-induced PTSD"); David McCord, Syn-
dromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the Admissibility of Non-
traditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REv. 19, 39 n.64 (1987)
(noting that PTSD "has been the most fertile new diagnostic category in DSM III for pro-
ponents of nontraditional psychological evidence"); see also Karla Fischer, Note, Defining
the Boundaries of Admissible Expert Psychological Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome,
1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 703-31; cf. Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Re-
sponses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1191, 1198-201 (1993) (disagreeing with the overreliance on PTSD to explain
BWS); Toni M. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma
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elude the child sexual abuse syndromes," 8 postpartum psychosis,119
urban survival syndrome, 120 and Vietnam veteran syndrome.'
2' Al-
though typically introduced by defendants, syndrome evidence also
may be used to rehabilitate testimony from the victim of the crime,
helping prosecutors secure a conviction. As with evidence of PTSD
used to support emotional distress claims in tort litigation, to the ex-
tent that courts have admitted testimony about some of these syn-
dromes,'2 they may have done so as part of a doctrinal development.
For instance, a diagnosis of battered woman syndrome (BWS) does
Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L.
REV. 395, 464 (1985) (questioning the analogy).
118. See Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, The Reliability of Expert Psychologi-
cal Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 2027 (1994);
Thomas D. Lyon & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Relevance Ratio: Evaluating the Probative
Value of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 43 (1996).
119. See Jennifer L. Grossman, Note, Postpartum Psychosis-A Defense to Criminal
Responsibility or Just Another Gimmick?, 67 U. DET. L. REv. 311, 336-37, 344 (1990)
(noting the similarities between postpartum psychosis, as a defense to infanticide, and
PTSD, though recognizing that the absence of the former in the DSM makes it less likely
to gain judicial acceptance); see also id. at 337-43 (discussing the possible defensive uses of
premenstrual syndrome); Beth E. Bookwalter, Note, Throwing the Bath Water out with the
Baby: Wrongful Exclusion of Expert Testimony on Neonaticide Syndrome, 78 B.U. L.
REV. 1185 (1998).
120. See Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based upon the Toxicity of
the Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black Rage, 74 N.C.
L. REV. 731, 738-41 (1996); cf. Werner v. State, 711 S.W.2d 639, 644-45 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986) (upholding the exclusion of "Holocaust syndrome" evidence).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 713 F.2d 1066, 1069, 1076-77 (5th Cir. 1983);
State v. Felde, 422 So. 2d 370, 376-78 (La. 1982); State v. Coogan, 453 N.W.2d 186, 190-92
(Wis. Ct. App. 1990); see also State v. Phipps, 883 S.W.2d 138, 141-43 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1994) (Gulf War veteran); C. Peter Erlinder, Paying the Price for Vietnam" Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder and Criminal Behavior, 25 B.C. L. REV. 305, 317 (1984) ("Once PTSD was
recognized as a disorder that could be isolated and diagnosed by psychiatrists and psy-
chologists, it became a legitimate issue to be raised in legal proceedings."); Michael J. Da-
vidson, Note, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: A Controversial Defense for Veterans of a
Controversial War, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415, 422 (1988) ("Although PTSD has re-
ceived a mixed reception in the legal community, it has achieved some success as a legal
defense [for Vietnam veterans]." (footnotes omitted)).
122. See Shirley A. Dobbin et al., A Case Law Analysis of Battered Woman Syndrome
and Rape Trauma Syndrome Evidence After Daubert, 82 JUDICATURE (forthcoming 1999)
(concluding that psychiatric diagnoses are regarded as expert knowledge rather than scien-
tific evidence subject to Daubert); Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice
Through Psychological Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REv. 1, 76-81 (1993) (explaining
that clinical judgment is as much an art as science); Krista L. Duncan, Note, "Lies,
Damned Lies, and Statistics"? Psychological Syndrome Evidence in the Courtroom After
Daubert, 71 IND. L.J. 753 (1996). For the most part, however, judges and jurors have re-
jected testimony supporting novel psychological defenses. See Peter Arenella, Demysti-
fying the Abuse Excuse: Is There One?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 703 (1996); Richard
J. Bonnie, Excusing and Punishing in Criminal Adjudication: A Reality Check, 5 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1995).
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not satisfy traditional requirements for the assertion of a self-defense
defense, but courts and legislatures seem to have used general evi-
dence about BWS to justify an expansion of the self-defense doctrine
in this limited context.123
Whatever its guise, the use of such syndrome evidence has at-
tracted significant criticism.124 This Article, however, centers less on
the more typical inquiry about whether and how courts should ac-
commodate this sort of information, than on attempting to under-
stand why mental health professionals have developed these syn-
drome labels. In short, have the needs of litigants rather than
clinicians fueled a nosological expansion in psychiatry, so that BWS
and related disorders emerged at least in part to serve forensic rather
than therapeutic ends? To some extent, this seems to have hap-
pened.125 A fuller discussion of this development and its conse-
quences is reserved for Part III.
E. Disability Rights Litigation
Along with administrative agencies and courts, legislatures have
expressed a distinct preference for basing eligibility for certain statu-
tory benefits on presumably objective diagnostic judgments made by
123. See Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence
Law, 46 DUKE L.J. 461, 485-91 (1996); Christopher Slobogin, Psychological Evidence in
Criminal Trials: To Junk or Not To Junk?, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1998); David L.
Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39
ARIz. L. REv. 67, 79-91 (1997); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1, 84-91 (1991).
124. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE ExCUSE: AND OTHER COP-OUTS,
SOB STORIES, AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY (1994); MARGARET A. HAGEN,
WHORES OF THE COURT: THE FRAUD OF PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY AND THE RAPE OF
AMERICAN JUSTICE 100-33 (1997); see also Victoria Nourse, The New Normativity: The
Abuse Excuse and the Resurgence of Judgment in the Criminal Law, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1435 (1998) (reviewing JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABUSE
EXCUSE THREATEN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM? (1997)).
125. See Mosteller, supra note 123, at 469-84, 507-08 (arguing that most psychological
syndromes, including child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) and BWS,
lack diagnostic utility and therefore should serve only a limited forensic purpose); John
E.B. Myers, Expert Testimony Describing Psychological Syndromes, 24 PAC. LJ. 1449,
1455-59 (1993) (calling these "nondiagnostic syndromes"); James T. Richardson et al., The
Problems of Applying Daubert to Psychological Syndrome Evidence, 79 JUDICATURE 10,
13 & n.25 (1995) (noting that CSAAS does not serve any psychiatric purpose as a diagnos-
tic tool); see also Donald Bross, Medical Diagnosis as a Gateway to the Child Welfare Sys-
tem: A Legal Review for Physicians, Lawyers, and Social Workers, 65 DENV. U. L. REV.
213, 249 (1988) ("[M]edical diagnoses provide important data to the child welfare system
[concerning possible instances of abuse], and physicians and social workers must consider
all of the ways in which medical issues are related to documenting or rejecting a need for
intervention."); cf. Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket Rape Trauma Syndrome, Psychi-
atric Labeling, and Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1271, 1286-311 (1994) (criticizing the efforts to
diagnose and treat rape trauma syndrome).
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medical professionals. This section and the next ask whether federal
statutes have encouraged a proliferation of vague diagnoses of learn-
ing disorders and other types of disabilities that might require ac-
commodations by employers and educational institutions or might
provide access to public disability insurance. These sections will sug-
gest that such programs ask medical professionals to certify the le-
gitimacy of asserted disabilities-in effect, dispensing diagnoses that
may serve no particular therapeutic purpose.
In enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
126 Con-
gress sought to bar discrimination against disabled individuals, in part
by requiring the provision of reasonable accommodations in employ-
ment, public transportation, and places of public accommodation. 127
Under this statute, disability means "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities."'128 Notwith-
standing the Act's apparently broad definition, a number of courts
have construed its coverage quite narrowly.
29
Although courts generally have accepted any kind of condition
as constituting a physical impairment,130 proof of such a medical im-
126. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(1994)).
127. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a) & (b)(5), 12182(a) & (b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994); see also Bon-
nie P. Tucker, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: An Overview, 22 N.M. L. REV.
13 (1992). Previously, Congress had required that federal agencies and federally-funded
programs not discriminate against "handicapped" persons. See Rehabilitation Act of
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1994)). See generally LAURA F. ROTHSIN, DISABILIF_s AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1997).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) (adding that the term includes persons having "a rec-
ord of such an impairment" or "being regarded as having such an impairment"); see also
29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994) (same definition used in the Rehabilitation Act); 42 U.S.C.
§ 3602(h) (1994) (same definition for "handicap" in the Fair Housing Act); Symposium,
Defining the Parameters of Coverage Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Who Is
"An Individual with a Disability"?, 42 VILL. L. REV. 327 (1997); James M. Zappa, Note,
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Improving Judicial Determinations of Whether
an Individual Is "Substantially Limited," 75 MINN. L. REV. 1303 (1991) (identifying ambi-
guities in the definition).
129. See, e.g., Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 121 F.3d 537, 539-41 (9th Cir. 1997);
Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F3d 800,805-06 (5th Cir. 1997); McKay v. Toyota
Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369, 372-74 (6th Cir. 1997); Soileau v. Guilford of
Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997); Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc.,
101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir. 1996); Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assocs., 100 F.3d 907, 911-12
(11th Cir. 1996); see also Wendy Wilkinson, Judicially Crafted Barriers to Bringing Suit
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 38 S. TEx. L. REv. 907, 908-09 (1997) (criticiz-
ing this trend).
130. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2204 (1998) ("H.I.V. infection must
be regarded as a physiological disorder with a constant and detrimental effect on the in-
fected person's hemic and lymphatic systems from the moment of infection."); Whillock v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1555, 1562-66 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (holding that the plain-
tiff's claim of disability based on a diagnosis of MCS, though dubious, created a jury ques-
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pairment satisfies only the first part of the statute's functional defini-
tion of disability. As the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) explained, "[t]he determination of whether an individ-
ual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis
of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that im-
pairment on the life of the individual."'131 Thus, courts have held that
obesity does not amount to a qualifying disability.132 As Judge Rich-
ard Posner wrote in a recent opinion rejecting the claim of an em-
ployee with hypercholesterolemia, the ADA "is not a general protec-
tion of medically afflicted persons."' 33 Under the Act, an impairment
tion, but that her request to work at home was unreasonable and established that she was
not an otherwise qualified individual), affd mem., 86 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 1996); Steven S.
Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class: Redefining the Scope of Disability Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 107, 110 (1997) (noting that
"[t]he term has been construed liberally so that if a person has any kind of physical condi-
tion, courts generally assume that it constitutes a physical impairment"); William J.
McDevitt, Defining the Term "Disability" Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 10
ST. THOMAs L. REV. 281, 285-88 (1998); cf. Maulding v. Sullivan, 961 F.2d 694, 698 (8th
Cir. 1992) (rejecting a disability discrimination claim under the Rehabilitation Act because
plaintiff had failed to establish that she suffered from chemical sensitivity or respiratory
problems that would be aggravated by her assigned job duties). But see Runnebaum v.
NationsBank, 123 F.3d 156, 167-70 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that asymptomatic
HIV is not an impairment).
131. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) app. (1998). The EEOC rules provide that impairments may
include:
Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculo-
skeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovas-
cular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and en-
docrine; or... [a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities.
Id. § 1630.2(h); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,333 (providing the same illustrations); 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1998) (defini-
tion of "disability" in the DOJ's implementing regulations); Todd Lebowitz, Note, Evalu-
ating Purely Reproductive Disorders Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 724 (1997) (arguing that infertility is an "impairment" but does not rise to the
status of a covered disability). Congress avoided adopting an exhaustive list of qualifying
disabilities, however, in part because it recognized the need for flexibility in the definition
to allow future coverage of disorders that have yet to be identified. See H.R. REP. No.
101-485(I1I), at 27 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,450.
132. See, e.g., Smaw v. Commonwealth of Virginia Dep't of State Police, 862 F. Supp.
1469, 1475 (E.D. Va. 1994) ("The case law and the regulations both point unrelentingly to
the conclusion that a claim based on obesity is not likely to succeed under the ADA.");
Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143, 1154 (Cal. 1993) (rejecting employment
discrimination claim where worker could not establish that her obesity was the result of a
disorder); see also Jane Byeff Korn, Fat, 77 B.U. L. REv. 25 (1997) (arguing that the ADA
should protect obese individuals).
133. Christian v. St. Anthony Med. Ctr., Inc., 117 F.3d 1051, 1053 (7th Cir. 1997) ("If
the employer discriminates against [employees] on account of their being (or being be-
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must substantially limit a major life activity.
Although the ADA covers both physical and mental impair-
ments, disability claims based on mental illnesses present special diffi-
culties.'3 Courts have recognized a number of mental disorders as
potentially covered by the ADA or Rehabilitation Act,135 but they
have rejected several others. 136 For example, the status of alcoholism
has generated particular controversy in the past,137 posing difficult
questions about how best to categorize and respond to other common
lieved by him to be) ill, even permanently ill, but not disabled, there is no violation.").
134. See, e.g., Laura F. Rothstein, The Employer's Duty to Accommodate Performance
and Conduct Deficiencies of Individuals with Mental Impairments Under Disability Dis-
crimination Laws, 47 SYRACUsE L. REv. 931 (1997); John D. Thompson, Psychiatric Dis-
orders, Workplace Violence and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 19 HAMLINE L. REV.
25, 35-44 (1995); see also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS,
PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACr (1994); MENTAL DISORDER, WORK DISABILITY, AND THE LAW (Richard J. Bonnie
& John Monahan eds., 1997).
135. One commentator recently offered the following interesting catalog:
[Clourts have found panic disorder, nervous conditions, depressive illness, anxi-
ety disorder, apraxia, emotional conditions, personality disorders, post traumatic
stress disorder, mental illness, paranoia and paranoid schizophrenia, anxiety neu-
rosis, kleptomania, compulsive gambling, manic depression or bipolar disorder,
extreme stress reaction, claustrophobia, dythmia and agoraphobia, and phobic
reaction to carbon monoxide, to be covered, although in many of these cases the
individual was found not to be otherwise qualified or could not be reasonably ac-
commodated.
Rothstein, supra note 134, at 963-65 (footnotes omitted); see also Thompson, supra note
134, at 37 ("Depression, schizophrenia, post-traumatic stress disorder, compulsive gam-
bling, borderline personality organization with obsessive compulsive features, bipolar dis-
order, explosive personality disorder and anxiety disorder are some of the diagnoses that
have qualified as 'mental handicaps."' (footnotes omitted)).
136. See Rothstein, supra note 134, at 962-63 ("Courts have found that conditions such
as fear of heights, paranoid schizophrenia controlled with medication, stress management
requiring medication, bipolar modal disorder, sexual behavior disorders, post traumatic
stress disorder, having a violent temper, depression, and various [other] mental health
problems were not covered disabilities." (footnotes omitted)); id. at 965 (adding that
"[p]ersonality traits, such as impatience, having a short temper, rudeness, arrogance or
being difficult to get along with are not impairments under the ADA"); Thompson, supra
note 134, at 40-43 (same). Indeed, these statutes now specifically exempt from coverage
the following "conditions": homosexuality, bisexuality, transvestitism, transsexualism, pe-
dophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical
impairments, other sexual behavior disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyro-
mania, and psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of
drugs. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(E)-(F) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (1994).
137. See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 550-52 (1988) (upholding VA decision to
consider alcoholism "willful misconduct" which would not toll the deadline for applying
for veterans' benefits); Wendy K. Voss, Note, Employing the Alcoholic Under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990,33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 895 (1992); see also HERBERT
FINGARETrE, HEAVY DRINKING: THE MYTH OF ALCOHOLISM AS A DISEASE (1988);
GEORGE VAILLANT, THE NATURAL HISTORY OF ALCOHOLISM REVISITED (1995).
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addictive behaviors.
Even relatively uncontroversial mental disorders may present
problems in the ADA context. Unlike many physical limitations,
employees may not discover that they suffer from a mental illness un-
til after being discharged for displaying some sort of aberrant behav-
ior.138 Even for previously diagnosed mental impairments, employees
may steadfastly deny that they suffer from the illness or else hesitate
to inform their employers.
139
Accommodations for learning disabilities in educational settings
present similar difficulties. In 1990, in tandem with the ADA, Con-
gress updated existing federal laws in this area by revising the Indi-
viduals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).140 That statute ap-
plies to children with "specific learning disabilities... who by reason
thereof, need special education and related services.' 41 It mandates
that states provide such students with a free and appropriate public
education in the least restrictive environment possible. 142
The Department of Education estimates that more than five per-
cent of all children enrolled in school suffer from specific learning
disabilities.143 Students identifying themselves with learning disabili-
ties and requesting accommodations under the ADA also are be-
138. See, e.g., Mears v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (S.D. Ga.
1995) (agoraphobia), affd, 87 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 1996); Stola v. Joint Indus. Bd., 889 F.
Supp. 133,134-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (anxiety disorder).
139. See Rothstein, supra note 134, at 948-50.
140. Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-1485 (1994)). See generally Daniel H. Melvin II, Comment, The Desegregation of
Children with Disabilities, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 599 (1995).
141. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1998). The statute defines learning dis-
abled children as
those children who have a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological pro-
cesses involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or written, which
disorder may manifest itself in imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read,
write, spell, or do mathematical calculations. Such disorders include such condi-
tions as perceptual disabilities, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia,
and developmental aphasia. Such term does not include children who have
learning problems which are primarily the result of visual, hearing, or motor dis-
abilities, of mental retardation, of emotional disturbance, or of environmental,
cultural, or economic disadvantage.
Id. § 1401(a)(15); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.541 (1998) (elaborating on this definition).
142. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a); Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 119 S.
Ct. 992, 997-99 (1999) (construing the reach of this requirement quite broadly).
143. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS,
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT: 16TH
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 7 (1994) (noting that "students with specific learning
disabilities now account for... 5.2 percent of all students age 6 through 17 enrolled in
school"); see also Cynthia Crossen, Colleges Court Students with Learning Disabilities,
WALL ST. J., May 27, 1998, at B1 ("The number of children in the U.S. diagnosed with
learning disabilities stands at an estimated two million .... ).
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coming much more common in higher education.'" Even more so
than mental illnesses, learning disabilities have proven quite difficult
to define and identify in particular individuals.145 Documentation of a
student's asserted learning disability generally "must come from an
individual qualified to diagnose a learning disability, such as a learn-
ing disability specialist, educational psychologist or clinical psycholo-
gist.' 46 Some have criticized the development of a cottage industry
of medical or educational professionals available to certify that a stu-
dent suffers from a learning disability as well as the growing tendency
to define new types of such disabilities. 147
144. See Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) and Section 504 to Colleges and Universities: An Overview and Discussion of Spe-
cial Issues Relating to Students, 23 J.C. & U.L. 1, 21 (1996); see also Susan Johanne Adams,
Because They're Otherwise Qualified: Accommodating Learning Disabled Law Student
Writers, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 189, 197 (1996) ("According to the Law School Admission
Council, between 1990 and 1993 there was a 100 percent increase in requests for accom-
modations on the LSAT because of learning disabilities."); Tamar Lewin, Court Supports
Aid to Disabled for Bar Exams, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16,1998, at Al.
145. See, e.g., Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 792 (1st Cir. 1992)
(noting that the student had not been conclusively identified as having a specific learning
disability). See generally JEAN KNOX, LEARNING DISABILITIES (1989) (identifying nu-
merous characteristics of learning disabilities and wide ranges in their severity). In some
cases, courts have found that students had failed to prove that they suffered from a learn-
ing disability. See, e.g., Price v. National Bd. of Med. Examiners, 966 F. Supp. 419,423-24
(S.D. W. Va. 1997); Argen v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 860 F. Supp. 84, 88-
91 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); Pazer v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 849 F. Supp. 284,
287 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
146. Tucker, supra note 144, at 14 n.56; see also Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 974 F.
Supp. 106,135-40 (D. Mass. 1997) (invalidating stringent documentation requirements that
mandated retesting every three years and diagnosis by a professional with a doctoral-level
degree). The DSM-IV provides the following guidance:
Learning Disorders are diagnosed when the individual's achievement on indi-
vidually administered, standardized tests in reading, mathematics, or written ex-
pression is substantially below that expected for age, schooling, and level of in-
telligence.... Substantially below is usually defined as a discrepancy of more
than 2 standard deviations between achievement and IQ.
DSM-IV, supra note 115, at 46; see also John L. Doris, Defining Learning Disabilities: A
History of the Search for Consensus, in BETrER UNDERSTANDING LEARNING
DISABILITIES 97, 107-12 (G. Reid Lyon et al. eds., 1993); M. Kay Runyan & Joseph F.
Smith, Jr., Identifying and Accommodating Learning Disabled Law School Students, 41 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 317,317-24 (1991). For example, "dysgraphia" is a condition characterized
by an inability to produce thoughts on paper in a readable form, and "dyscalculia" refers
to difficulty with math. See id. at 341-42.
147. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES
29-33,100 (1997); WALTER OLSON, THE EXCUSE FACTORY: How EMPLOYMENT LAW Is
PARALYZING THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 202-06 (1997); LOUISE SPEAR-SWERLING &
ROBERT J. STERNBERG, OFF TRACK: WHEN POOR READERS BECOME "LEARNING
DISABLED" 36-38, 316-22 (1996); Robert J. Sternberg, Extra Credit for Doing Poorly,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1997, at A23 ("[W]e have no way of knowing how many children
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Attention deficit disorder (ADD) has attracted particular notice
in recent years. ADD, sometimes also referred to as attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), has become a common diagnosis for
what in the past would have been characterized as behavioral or so-
cialization problems. 48 Generally identified in disruptive elementary
school students, and frequently treated with the psychoactive drug
methylphenidate hydrochloride (Ritalin®),149 ADD has been impli-
cated in all manner of educational difficulties. Some have even sug-
gested that, left untreated, ADD may last into adulthood and lead to
problems in the workplace, 50 reckless driving, and higher divorce
who have received such a diagnosis really have learning disabilities."); Jon Westling, One
University Defeats Disability Extremists, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 1997, at A21 (arguing that
some "learning-disabled students are victims of overblown and unscientific claims by some
learning disability advocates"). But see Note, Toward Reasonable Equality: Accommo-
dating Learning Disabilities Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1560, 1573-74 (1998) ("Although many experts in the field recognize the problematic na-
ture of the LD category-a broadly heterogeneous classification with disputed etiology-
most appear to believe that LDs, as distinguished from low general intelligence or so-
ciocultural disadvantage, exist.").
148. See Victor W. Henderson, Stimulant Drug Treatment of the Attention Deficit Dis-
order, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 397, 401-04 (1991) (canvassing the debate over the diagnostic
criteria for ADD); see also Guckenberger, 974 F. Supp. at 139-40 (rejecting challenge to
stringent documentation rules for ADD); DSM-IV, supra note 115, at 83-85 (basing the
diagnosis of ADD on the sustained presence of six out of nine vague behaviors, including
"easily distracted" or "forgetful," which "are not better accounted for by another mental
disorder").
149. See Larry S. Goldman et al., Diagnosis and Treatment of Attention-Deficit-
Hyperactivity Disorder in Children and Adolescents, 279 JAMA 1100, 1100 (1998) ("Al-
though some children are being diagnosed as having ADHD with insufficient evaluation
and in some cases stimulant medication is prescribed when treatment alternatives exist,
there is little evidence of widespread overdiagnosis or misdiagnosis of ADHD or of wide-
spread overprescription of methylphenidate by physicians."); Henderson, supra note 148,
at 405-09 (summarizing controversies over the use of stimulants to treat ADD); Attention
Disorder in Children Still Eludes Treatment Method, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1998, at A24; see
also RICHARD DEGRANDPRE, RITALiN NATION (1999); PETER SCHRAG & DIANE
DIVOKY, THE MYTH OF THE HYPERACTIVE CHILD 57 (1975) ("In many respects, the
cure preceded the ailment .... CIBA-Geigy promoted Ritalin-its league-leading drug
for hyperactive children-for use with children who exhibited 'functional behavior prob-
lems,' a category so vague that no child need be excluded."); id. at xiv (objecting to the
"growing scientific and corporate establishment conducting research in the proliferating
'syndromes' and 'diseases' of nonconformity").
150. See David J. Morrow, Attention Disorder Is Found in Growing Number of Adults,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1997, at Al (reporting "estimate[s] that 6 million to 9.5 million
American adults have the disorder, making it as common as severe clinical depression or
drug abuse," and describing some of the problems that they face in occupational settings).
"But some skeptics say that A.D.D.'s prevalence has been overstated, and among these
are some who question the existence of the disorder." Id.; see also John Lang, Fraud or
Fact? Diagnosis for Attention Deficit Disorders Mushrooms, but There Are Skeptics,
KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, June 23,1997, at B1.
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rates.'5 ' ADD's opposite, which might be called "attention surplus,"
may itself qualify as a mental illness.
152
Finally, under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,153 most
employers must allow their workers to take unpaid leaves of absence
if they, or a close relative, suffer from a "serious health condition."'
54
Employers may demand that any employees who request such a leave
first provide an appropriate certification from their physician.' 55 Em-
ployers may contest such a certification only if they arrange and pay
for a second opinion of the employee's or family member's condi-
tion.156 In the event that the first and second opinions conflict, the
employer may then arrange and pay for a third and dispositive opin-
ion from a physician concerning the seriousness of the employee's or
close relative's claimed health condition.157 Thus, to an even greater
extent than the ADA and IDEA, diagnostic judgments by medical
professionals provide the essential ticket for admission into the pro-
151. See Wendy Swallow Williams, Attention Deficit Disorder: Malady Thought to Af-
fect Only Children May Actually Last a Lifetime, PITt. POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 28, 1997, at
El.
152. Intensely focused and hard-working individuals may "suffer" from obsessive-
compulsive personality disorder. See DSM-IV, supra note 115, at 669, 671 (analogizing
this disorder to the "type A" personality popularized as a risk factor for heart disease by
cardiologists); cf. WALTER 0. WEYRAUCH, THE PERSONALITY OF LAWYERS 264-67
(1964) (suggesting that lawyers share many characteristics with compulsive neurotics).
Please pass the Prozac!
153. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654
(1994)). See generally Jane Rigler, Analysis and Understanding of the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993,45 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 457 (1995); Nancy R. Daspit, Comment, The
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Great Idea but a "Rube Goldberg" Solution?, 43
EMORY L.J. 1351 (1994).
154. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) & (D) (1994). "The term 'serious health condition'
means an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves-(A)
inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility; or (B) continuing
treatment by a health care provider." Id. § 2611(11); see also Bauer v. Varity Dayton-
Walther Corp., 118 F.3d 1109, 1110-12 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that an employee who suf-
fered from intermittent episodes of hematochezia (rectal bleeding) did not have a "serious
medical condition" entitling him to an unpaid leave); Vasconcellos v. Cybex Int'l, Inc., 962
F. Supp. 701,705-06 (D. Md. 1997) (holding that severe nervous disorder could qualify as a
"serious medical condition" under the Act); Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F.
Supp. 102, 105-06 (D.R.I. 1997) (holding that hypertension and arrhythmia did not qual-
ify).
155. See 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a) & (b); Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 889 F. Supp. 253, 259
(N.D. Miss. 1995) (holding that an employee who suffered food poisoning was not entitled
to the Act's protections in part because he did not provide the necessary certification),
affd, 74 F.3d 91 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). This section calls for certification by a
"health care provider," which the statute elsewhere defines as a licensed doctor of medi-
cine or osteopathy or "any other person determined by the Secretary [of Labor] to be ca-
pable of providing health care services." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(6).
156. See 29 U.S.C. § 2613(c).
157. See id. § 2613(d).
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tections of this particular statutory scheme.
F. Disability Insurance Programs
Federal disability insurance programs also require medical judg-
ments about impairments. Under Social Security Disability Insur-
ance, which covers disabled workers who have paid payroll taxes,
158
and Supplemental Security Income, which provides benefits to the
disabled poor,159 the definition of disability requires claimants to
demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impair-
ment.' 60 Commentators have recognized that physicians play a criti-
cal gatekeeping role in providing access to assistance under these two
programs: "[O]ur society has largely obfuscated the difficult choices
raised by these issues by delegating the assessment of the functional
impact of medical conditions to the medical profession. This delega-
tion reflects an assumption that such inquiries are subject to scientific
resolution and do not call for political choices.' 61 Indeed, the draft-
ers of the legislation consciously represented disability determina-
tions as based on objective medical facts rather than controversial so-
cial judgments regarding which individuals to excuse from an
obligation to work. 62
The Social Security Administration (SSA) has tried to implement
158. See Social Security Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-880, § 103(a), 70 Stat. 807,
815 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 423-425 (1994)).
159. See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 301, 86 Stat. 1329,
1465 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383d (1994)).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1994); see also id. § 423(d)(3) (adding that the impair-
ment must result from "abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques"); Lance Liebman, The Definition of Dis-
ability in Social Security and Supplemental Security Income: Drawing the Bounds of Social
Welfare Estates, 89 HARV. L. REv. 833, 842 (1976) ("The medical disability requirement
means that workers are not insured against unemployment caused by declines in capacity
or willingness to work that cannot be given a medical explanation.").
161. Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the Social
Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REv. 361, 387 (1996) (footnote omitted); see also GLENN,
supra note 4, at 58-59 ("[S]ocial bureaucracies like Disability and Medicaid, will be set into
motion by a few diagnostic words from the doctor."); id. at 148 ("In today's society, physi-
cians have become an ultimate authority on people's capacity to work. They are the le-
gitimizers, the arbitrators of disability .... ).
162 See DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE 68-89 (1984) (elaborating on the
legislature's effort to adopt a strict medical definition of disability notwithstanding physi-
cians' protestations of unavoidable subjectivity); Wilkinson, supra note 129, at 913-14 &
n.25 (suggesting that the federal disability support programs emerged during the "medi-
cal" model of disability policy, noting that eligibility determinations focus "on clinical di-
agnosis of the impairment with no regard to environmental factors"). Newer legislation,
such as the ADA, represents a shift to a "civil rights" model. See id. at 915.
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this medical approach to identifying disabled persons. 63 Even so, the
threshold diagnostic judgments about impairments have proven to be
quite imprecise, 164 and the SSA has struggled with the question of
how much weight to give the opinions of a claimant's own physician
as opposed to those designated by the Agency. 65 Most contested
claims for Social Security disability benefits involve chronic pain,166 a
notoriously difficult complaint for physicians to verify.167
Chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) has become a popular diagnosis
for disability claimants in the last several years. 68 This condition,
sometimes called chronic fatigue immune dysfunction syndrome (or
associated with Epstein-Barr virus) in an effort to reinforce the claim
that it has an organic source,169 is associated with a combination of
generalized and subjective symptoms of unknown cause such as ex-
163. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. pt. 404(p), app. 1, § 3.00(A) (1998) ("Respiratory impairments
usually can be evaluated under these listings on the basis of a complete medical history,
physical examination, a chest x-ray or other appropriate imaging techniques, and spiro-
metric pulmonary function tests.").
164. See GLENN, supra note 4, at 153 ("If diagnostic certainty could be obtained, the
appeal to physicians for data in eligibility or disability determinations might have a
sounder basis. But since many diagnostic impressions are hypothesis at best, the prestige
of the physician's statement conceals the fact that it is mainly opinion."); STONE, supra
note 162, at 129 ("[Ihe diagnostic decisions on which judgments of impairment rest are
themselves subject to an enormous degree of uncertainty.").
165. See 56 Fed. Reg. 36,932, 36,950-53, 36,960-62 (1991) (codified at 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527 (1998)); see also Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 1995); Tussey v.
Island Creek Coal Co., 982 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th Cir. 1993); Ghant v. Bowen, 930 F.2d 633,
639 (8th Cir. 1991); James A. Maccaro, The Treating Physician Rule and the Adjudication
of Claims for Social Security Disability Benefits, N.Y. ST. BJ., Nov. 1992, at 28, 29 (ex-
plaining that testimony from a claimant's treating physician is usually given significant
weight). In administering the Black Lung Benefits program, the Department of Labor has
proposed formally giving the medical opinion of the coal miner's treating physician controlling
weight. See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969,
as Amended, 62 Fed. Reg. 3338, 3375 (1997) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 718.104(d)) (pro-
posed Jan. 22,1997).
166. See Aim~e E. Bierman, Note, The Medico-Legal Enigma of Fibromyalgia" Social Se-
curity Disability Determinations and Subjective Complaints of Pain, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 259,
273 (1998); Spencer Rich, Seeking to End Disability Fraud, Government Lays Hands on
Pain: Experts Seek Ways to Measure True Extent of Impairment, WASH. POST, Feb. 3,
1986, at A13.
167. See KLEINMAN, supra note 5, at 56-59; Erin Margaret Masson, Note, Social Secu-
rity Administration Nonacquiescence on the Standard for Evaluating Pain, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1819, 1836-40 (1995); Elisabeth Rosenthal, Chronic Pain Fells Many Yet
Lacks Clear Cause, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1992, at C1. See generally EVALUATION AND
TREATMENT OF CHRONIC PAIN (Gerald M. Aronoff ed., 1985); Oye Gureje et al., Persis-
tent Pain and Well-Being: A World Health Organization Study in Primary Care, 280 JAMA
147 (1998).
168. See infra note 172; see also ARONOWITZ, supra note 32, at 30 ("Disability has also
been a central concern in chronic fatigue syndrome.").
169. See ARONOWrrZ, supra note 32, at 24-27.
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haustion, sore throat, confusion, and depression. 70 Although pro-
found skepticism prevails among medical professionals about the
supposed pathophysiological as opposed to psychosomatic origin of
these symptoms,171 several courts have accepted physicians' diagnoses
of CFS as a qualifying disability. 72 Thus, in all of these federal dis-
ability programs, especially Social Security insurance and to a lesser
extent under the ADA, the definition and identification of disease by
medical professionals directly informs judgments about a claimant's
eligibility for coverage.
The proper administration of claims for benefits under state
workers' compensation systems obviously depends on accurate medi-
cal assessments about occupational injuries.173 In lieu of tort litiga-
tion, these programs allow workers to apply for limited monetary
170. See Gary P. Holmes et al., Chronic Fatigue Syndrome: A Working Case Definition,
108 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 387,387-89 (1988); Letters, Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, 279
JAMA 431-33 (1998) (discussing diagnostic ambiguities); see also ARONOWITZ, supra note
32, at 31 ("Another ideological objection to the legitimacy of these diseases is the concern
that their diagnoses are controlled more by the patient than the physician. The patient-
centered CDC criteria for chronic fatigue syndrome, for example, are perceived as permit-
ting the patient, rather than the doctor, to define the disease."); Rumi K. Price et al., Esti-
mating the Prevalence of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and Associated Symptoms in the
Community, 107 PUB. HEALTH REP. 514, 521 (1992) ("An increasing number of patients
with these symptoms, prompted by media information about CFS, may be seeking evalua-
tion for CFS, even though definitive cases of CFS [as defined by CDC's restrictive criteria]
represent only a fraction of these patients.").
171. See ARONOWITZ, supra note 32, at 168 (The controversy "over our present-day
chronic fatigue syndrome is suffused with the perception that there is a large market of
would-be patients searching for legitimizing diagnoses."); id. at 174 ("Diseases--such as
chronic fatigue syndrome-whose mechanisms are obscure, whose specificity is question-
able, and whose definition and meaning are transparently influenced by social factors have
had their legitimacy questioned."); Gael MacLean & Simon Wessely, Professional and
Popular Views of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, 308 BRIT. MED. J. 776, 776 (1994) ("Most
research papers did not favour organic causes."); see also John Joyce et al., Reviewing the
Reviews: The Example of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, 280 JAMA 264 (1998) (describing
weaknesses in the quality of scientific articles on chronic fatigue syndrome).
172. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 433, 440-43 (3d Cir. 1997); Rose
v. Shalala, 34 F.3d 13, 16-19 (1st Cir. 1994); Sisco v. HHS, 10 F.3d 739, 744-45 (10th Cir.
1993); Irwin v. Shalala, 840 F. Supp. 751, 761 (D. Or. 1993); see also Sarchet v. Chater, 78
F.3d 305, 306-08 (7th Cir. 1996) (fibromyalgia). In contrast, courts generally have upheld
denials of benefits to persons complaining of multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome. See,
e.g., Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 237-39 (5th Cir. 1994); Brown v. Shalala, 15 F.3d
97, 99-100 (8th Cir. 1994); cf. Donato v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 375, 380 (7th
Cir. 1994) (rejecting a challenge to a private insurer's denial of benefits); Kouril v. Bowen,
912 F.2d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding possible SSA disability).
173. See generally 7 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS'
COMPENSATION LAW §§ 79.50-79.54 (rev. ed. 1998). "The increasing tendency, then, to
accept awards unsupported by medical testimony should not be allowed to obscure the
basic necessity of establishing medical causation by expert testimony in all but the simple
and routine cases ... ." Id. § 79.54(i), at 15-426.214.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50
PIGEONHOLING ILLNESS
awards under a schedule of benefits for different types of job-related
harms. Although causation questions will arise and require medical
testimony, workers' compensation boards and reviewing courts do
not invariably require expert testimony on questions concerning the
extent of an employee's disability.174 When the claims involve acute
occupational injuries, this system poses relatively few complexities,
though physicians may be asked to quantify the degree of permanent
impairment associated with such injuries. 175
Increasingly, however, workers' compensation claims involve soft
tissue injuries, long latency diseases, or mental illnesses allegedly trig-
gered by employment. 176 Among physical injuries, cumulative trauma
disorders such as carpal tunnel syndrome have become quite preva-
lent in recent years.177 Among occupational diseases, workers' com-
174. See, e.g., Valente v. Bourne Mills, 75 A.2d 191,194 (R.I. 1950) (refusing to "turn a
compensation case into a clinic where doctors seek to determine the 'diagnosis' of a pa-
tient's ailment and the 'pathological nature' of that condition according to the more ex-
acting norms of medical science"); LARSON & LARSON, supra note 173, § 79.53, at 15-
426.167 (explaining that "disability is not a purely medical question'). For an argument
that an overemphasis on the medical model leads to undercompensation in this and other
compensation systems, see Ellen Smith Pryor, Compensation and a Consequential Model
of Loss, 64 TuL. L. REv. 783,790,793-94 (1990).
175. See STEVEN BAB1ITSKY & JAMES J. MANGRAVITI, JR., UNDERSTANDING THE
AMA GUIDES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION (2d ed. 1997); see also Ellen Smith Pryor,
Flawed Promises: A Critical Evaluation of the American Medical Association's Guides to
the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 103 HARv. L. REV. 964, 966-69, 973-75 (1990)
(book review) (criticizing the suggestion that impairments can be measured in an entirely
objective, medical way). Courts have upheld decisions to exclude testimony concerning
the extent of an impairment or causation offered by persons other than physicians. See,
e.g., Weis v. Division of Workers' Comp., 755 P.2d 1385, 1386-87 (Mont. 1988) (rejecting
chiropractor's challenge to a rule requiring that licensed physicians testify as to physical
impairment); Brannan v. Department of Labor & Indus., 700 P.2d 1139, 1141-43 (Wash.
1985) (same); see also Erving v. Tri-Con Indus., 314 N.W.2d 253, 254-56 (Neb. 1982)
(holding that the agency could ignore psychiatric testimony that the claimant's impairment
represented a "conversion reaction"); In re Newcomb, 690 A.2d 562, 564-65 (N.H. 1997)
(upholding the board's decision to reject testimony by claimant's physician finding "reflex
sympathetic dystrophy" where other medical evidence indicated an absence of objective
symptomology); Latraille v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 481 N.W.2d 446, 449-
50 (N.D. 1992) (finding the testimony of two rheumatologists more credible than that of a
chiropractor consulted long after the injury).
176. See, e.g., ORIN KRAMER & RICHARD BRIFFAULT, WORKERS COMPENSATION:
STRENGTHENING THE SOCIAL COMPACr 18-23 (1991) (describing the expansion of the
definition of compensable injuries, from traumatic accidents and soft tissue injuries to oc-
cupational diseases and mental stress).
177. See, e.g., H. Douglas Jones & Cathy Jackson, Cumulative Trauma Disorders: A
Repetitive Strain on the Workers' Compensation System, 20 N. KY. L. REV. 765, 768-80
(1993); Denis Paul Juge et al., Cumulative Trauma Disorders-"The Disease of the 90's":
An Interdisciplinary Analysis, 55 LA. L. REV. 895, 912 (1995) ("There is considerable con-
troversy in the medical community regarding the validity of making a causal connection
between the activities at work and the diseases associated with CTDs. There is also con-
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pensation claims involving multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome
have proven to be among the most controversial. 178 As one court
wrote in the course of affirming an award of benefits based on MCS,
"[lt is of no great moment that the condition from which a claimant
suffers cannot be precisely diagnosed and named by the medical ex-
perts.' 79 Finally, of the mental illness claims, 80 post-traumatic stress
cern among physicians that psychological factors may be involved in the growing number
of patients reporting symptoms of CTDs."); Oliver Pancheri, Is There Light at the End of
the Carpal Tunnel? Compensation for Workers with Cumulative Trauma Disorders Under
Theories of Accident and Occupational Disease, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 377 (1999). Workers'
compensation boards and reviewing courts generally have approved benefits for repetitive
motion injuries when supported by an appropriate medical diagnosis. See, e.g., Lockeby v.
Massey Pulpwood, Inc., 812 S.W.2d 700,704 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991); Condon v. Boeing Co.,
903 P.2d 775, 780-81 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995). By comparison, products liability claims
brought against the equipment manufacturers have fared poorly. See Saul Hansell, U.S.
Jury Rejects Keyboard Injury Claims, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1998, at D2.
178. See Kelly Corbett, Comment, Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Syndrome: Occupa-
tional Disease or Work-Related Accident?, 24 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 395 (1997); see
also Synder et al., supra note 95, at 104 (arguing that "numerous psychosocial factors may
influence the self-reporting of symptoms by patients labeled as MCS," including "a work-
ers' compensation system that favors claimants, [and] the availability of physicians who
readily provide explanatory physiologic theories in the absence of supporting evidence");
supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text (discussing MCS in the context of tort litiga-
tion). Most courts have affirmed denials of workers' compensation claims based on MCS.
See, e.g., Weekley v. Industrial Comm'n, 615 N.E.2d 59,62-63 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Ruether
v. State, 455 N.W.2d 475, 477-78 (Minn. 1990); Halseth v. North Dakota Workers Comp.
Bureau, 514 N.W.2d 371,373-74 (N.D. 1994); Conradt v. Mt. Carmel Sch., 539 N.W.2d 713,
718-19 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995); see also La-Z-Boy Chair Co. v. Reed, 778 F. Supp. 954, 955
(E.D. Tenn. 1990) (rejecting testimony offered by a clinical ecologist), aff'd mem., 936
F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991).
179. Armstrong v. City of Wichita, 907 P.2d 923, 928 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) ("We do not
believe that the legislature intended to deny compensation to a worker who is disabled by
a condition which baffles medical experts and which resists their efforts to give it a specific
name or diagnosis."); see also id. (analogizing to AIDS and CFS); Sheridan v. Catering
Management, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 319,328 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that "a claimant
is not required to prove that a diagnosis is universally recognized by and agreed upon in
the medical community"). A few courts have held in favor of MCS claimants. See Mar-
lowe v. Dogs Only Grooming, 589 So. 2d 990, 992-93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); In re Ke-
hoe, 648 A.2d 472, 474 (N.H. 1994); Saif Corp. v. Scott, 824 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Or. Ct. App.
1992); Gray v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 657 A.2d 77,82-83 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
180. See 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 173, §§ 41-42; id. § 42.22(a), at 7-858 ("There
is almost no limit to the variety of disabling 'psychic' conditions that have already been
recognized as legitimately compensable--conditions which not many years ago would
have received little understanding or recognition on the part of courts."); Thomas S. Cook,
Workers' Compensation and Stress Claims: Remedial Intent and Restrictive Application, 62
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 879, 895-912 (1987); Lawrence Joseph, The Causation Issue in
Workers' Compensation Mental Disability Cases: An Analysis, Solutions, and a Perspective,
36 VAND. L. REV. 263 (1983). For examples of recent mental illness workers' compensa-
tion claims, many but not all of which were rejected on the facts by reviewing courts, see
South Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n v. Graham, 587 So. 2d 291, 295 (Miss. 1991) (fear of
heights); Osborne v. Oklahoma City Police Dep't, 882 P.2d 75, 76-78 (Okla. 1994) (panic
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disorder has become a common employee complaint, and, even
though these cases generally do not involve firefighters and police of-
ficers, most reviewing courts have accepted it as compensable. 181 Di-
agnostic judgments have become more critical as the system has
moved from severed limbs to immune responses of uncertain origin
or mental stress disorders.182 They also have become more pliable
and potentially subject to fraud.183
I. Consequences for the Health Care System
If diseases are created rather than discovered, as the social con-
structivists argue,184 what forces influence that process? Much of the
pressure is internal to the patient and the medical profession, 85 but
attack disorder with agoraphobia); Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal
Bd., 718 A.2d 759, 764 (Pa. 1998) (shift work maladaptation syndrome); see also Donald
M. Zupanec, Annotation, Mental Disorders as Compensable Under Workmen's Compen-
sation Acts, 97 A.L.R.3d 161 (1980 & Supp. 1998).
181. See, e.g., Southwire Co. v. George, 470 S.E.2d 865, 865-67 (Ga. 1996); Wood v.
Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 1255, 1256-58 (N.Y. 1990); Banks v. LTV Steel Co., 654
N.E.2d 439,442-43 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Daniel Constr. Co. v. Tolley, 480 S.E.2d 145,148,
(Va. Ct. App. 1997). But see In re Sutton, 684 A.2d 1346, 1347-48 (N.H. 1996) (benefits
inappropriate). See generally Richard S. Schottenfeld & Mark R. Cullen, Recognition of
Occupation-Induced Posttraumatic Stress Disorders, 28 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 365
(1986); supra notes 105-108 and accompanying text (discussing PTSD in the context of tort
litigation).
182. See 7 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 173, § 79.51(d), at 15-426.131 ("The advent
of a large volume and variety of occupational-and particularly respiratory-diseases
whose etiology ranges from the imperfectly-understood to the downright mysterious has
begun to precipitate questions on the extent to which awards can be based on incomplete
medical evidence as to the nature and causation of the disease."); Joan Hansen, Note, Sci-
entific Decisionmaking in Workers' Compensation: A Long Overdue Reform, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 911, 923 (1986) ("Occupational diseases are fraught with the potential for diagnostic
error.").
183. See Gary T. Schwartz, Waste, Fraud and Abuse in Workers' Compensation: The
Recent California Experience, 52 MD. L. REV. 983, 989-92 (1993) (describing one under-
cover journalist's experience of being "referred to seven different doctors, each of whom
conducted a medical-legal examination (so-called because it is a diagnostic examination
intended to produce medical information that is relevant to legal issues)," which "pro-
vide[d] apparent documentation for what in truth [was] a bogus claim").
184. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also Faith T. Fitzgerald, The Tyranny
of Health, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 196, 197-98 (1994) (describing the tendency to medical-
ize social problems); Gina Maranto, On the Fringes of the Bell Curve, The Evolving Quest
for Normality, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1998, at F7 (describing a recent conference sponsored
by Cornell University's Department of Science and Technology Studies "discussing the
diverse ways in which science and medicine, along with legal systems and states, shape so-
ciety's notions of who and what people are, who is sick and who is well").
185. See MICHAEL BALINT, THE DOCrOR, HIS PATIENT AND THE ILLNESS 22-25,107,
217 (1964) (describing the process of negotiating over a diagnosis); ELIOT FREIDSON,
PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED MEDICINE 244-
301 (1970) (describing the professional and lay constructions of illness); see also ANDREW
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some of it comes from outside, including from the legal profession.
Just as social forces have shaped medical practice, legal institutions
influence both nosology and diagnosis. Law and medicine are not
autonomous domains, fully insulated from one another in spite of
numerous points of intersection concerning the definition and identi-
fication of disease. Instead, at these junctures, law and medicine are
mutually constitutive or perhaps co-dependent.
Legal institutions have, of course, altered medical practice quite
directly, most notably through malpractice decisions.186 At the fed-
eral level, however, Congress generally has disclaimed any intent to
interfere with the practice of medicine. For instance, the very first
section of the Medicare statute provides that "[n]othing in this sub-
chapter shall be construed to authorize any Federal officer or em-
ployee to exercise any supervision or control over the practice of
medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided."
1 87
This Article has described one very important aspect of medical prac-
tice, diagnosis, that legal institutions have influenced indirectly and
unintentionally, though pervasively. In a sense, regulators and courts
function as something of a feedback mechanism for the medical pro-
fession as it defines and identifies diseases.
The recent emergence of novel diseases, such as multiple chemi-
cal sensitivity and chronic fatigue syndrome, may reflect a confluence
ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT
LABOR 40-44 (1988) (describing the role of diagnosis as a task found in many different
professions); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 20
(1982) ("As the various certifying and gatekeeping functions of doctors have grown, so has
the dependence of people seeking benefits that require certification."); Joseph Margolis,
The Concept of Disease, 1 J. MED. & PHIL. 238,238 (1976) (noting that "medicine and the
law are the two principal professional disciplines of advanced societies systematically con-
cerned with rendering judgments that are at once informed by selected norms of human
functioning and characterizable as findings of fact").
186. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,781-88 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (defining the
duty to secure informed consent with a patient-based standard); Korman v. Mallin, 858
P.2d 1145, 1149 (Alaska 1993) (same); Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 868-73 (Miss. 1985)
(replacing the locality rule with a national standard of care for medical malpractice ac-
tions); Sheeley v. Memorial Hosp., 710 A.2d 161, 166-67 (R.I. 1998) (same); Helling v.
Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 982-83 (Wash. 1974) (holding ophthalmologists liable for malpractice
notwithstanding adherence to the then-prevailing professional standard of care for glau-
coma testing). Some effects are less direct. For instance, growing malpractice litigation
has encouraged physicians to practice "defensive medicine" designed to protect them from
liability rather than promote patient welfare. See E. Haavi Morreim, Redefining Quality
By Reassigning Responsibility, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 79, 90-91 (1994); W. John Thomas,
The Medical Malpractice "Crisis": A Critical Examination of a Public Debate, 65 TEMP. L.
REV. 459,498-503 (1992).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1994); see also 21 U.S.C. § 396 (Supp. III 1997) (medical device
regulation); 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503, 16,504 (1972) ("[I]t is clear that Congress did not intend
the [FDA] to regulate or interfere with the practice of medicine ....").
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of two factors. First, patients with previously undiagnosed complaints
obviously may become frustrated and demand some medical-but
preferably not a psychiatric-label for their symptoms. 188 They may
do so for entirely personal reasons, but many patients also understand
the potential legal utility of a medical diagnosis, which is only par-
tially counterbalanced by concerns about their future insurability and
even social stigma. Second, some researchers and practitioners have
been willing to respond to such opportunities by defining and identi-
fying new syndromes in these patients.189 As Dr. Aronowitz has writ-
ten, there is a "widespread belief that those who are stressed and
mentally ill are an immense market for somatic diagnoses, making the
diagnosis of these syndromes vulnerable to abuse."' 9 Researchers
188. See, e.g., ARONOWITZ, supra note 32, at 73 ("A market for somatic labels exists in
the large pool of 'stressed-out' or somaticizing patients who seek to disguise an emotional
complaint or to 'upgrade' their diagnosis from a nebulous one to a legitimate disease.");
id. at 185. Aronowitz continues:
In receiving the [CFS] diagnosis, patients might find it easier to explain their suf-
fering to friends and family, take some relief in the generally benign prognosis,
feel satisfied that their problems are not all in their heads, make sense of the con-
fusing medical literature and try some interventions, and join a chronic fatigue
support group.
Id. at 185; see also id. at 75 (noting that "Lyme disease is socially perceived to be a fash-
ionable diagnosis"); TOOMBS, supra note 8, at 45 (arguing that "a scientific diagnosis vali-
dates the patient's experience and the lack of such a diagnosis suggests such experience is
not to be taken seriously as a medical problem"); Ronald E. Gots, Medical Hypothesis and
Medical Practice: Autointoxication and Multiple Chemical Sensitivities, 18 REG.
TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 2 (1993) ("In every era people have suffered varieties
of symptoms not readily explained by 'known' diseases of the day. To provide explana-
tions and treatment approaches, individuals with symptom complexes were frequently
provided a unifying disease label.... [But] newly named fad disorders have not survived
long term.").
189. See ARONOWITZ, supra note 32, at 182 ("Clinicians may be excited about the pos-
sibility of diagnosing a new disease or helping to prevent disease."); id. at 73 ("These doc-
tors explicitly link their view of Lyme disease as a serious threat to a call for funding re-
search, suggesting at least one possible motivation for their position."); GLENN, supra note
4, at 69 ("The physician is always willing, it seems, to extend the definition of illness and
come up with a diagnosis for almost any problem.").
190. ARONOWITZ, supra note 32, at 31-32.
The appearance of chronic fatigue syndrome... had everything to do with the
confluence of interests of investigators, clinicians, and laypersons. Investigators
were excited about the possibility of a new clinical syndrome caused by a well-
known virus; clinicians had a new name and framework for the ever-present
chronically fatigued patient; and patients were accorded the legitimacy attributed
to a new viral syndrome and-associated with it-the hope for rational treat-
ment.
Id. at 179-80; see also id. at 36 ("The conception of chronic fatigue as a disease also placed
limits on doctors' paternalistic judgments about the role of psychological factors in causing
symptoms."); id. at 104 ("[T]here has been a 'life-cycle' to the history of these diagnoses-
initial medical interest and promotion, followed by a rapid increase in the number of pa-
tients who get the diagnosis, and finally stigmatization and decline in usage."); Sparks et
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may try to capitalize on what they hope will prove to be a major bio-
medical breakthrough, and some clinicians may become opportunistic
popularizers of novel diseases.
To the extent that legal and related external pressures influence
the labeling of diseases and their diagnosis in particular patients, is
there anything troublesome about that? Do these external con-
straints corrupt an essentially scientific, taxonomic process? Should
medical professionals be forced to undertake a patient advocacy role
that competes and may even conflict with their more traditional role
of treating ill patients? The phrase primum non nocere expressed one
of the central maxims of the Hippocratic tradition-above all, physi-
cians should do no harm in dealing with their patients. 19' If the medi-
cal community defines or identifies diseases for reasons other than
their use in helping to select a course of treatment, however, diagnos-
tic judgments may run afoul of this bioethical principle of nonmalefi-
cence. Indeed, there may be significant costs to patients, the medical
profession, and society. The first section addresses these questions
with respect to nosology, the generic process of defining conditions as
diseases; the second section does so with respect to diagnosis, the
identification of these previously defined diseases in particular pa-
tients.
A. Nosology for Fun and Profit
As suggested in Part II, defining a condition as a disease may
help secure insurance coverage for treatments, improve the odds that
the FDA will approve new therapeutic products for marketing, allow
tort plaintiffs to side-step tricky causation questions, assist criminal
defendants in avoiding conviction, and expand eligibility for disability
programs and workers' compensation benefits. For instance, phar-
maceutical companies seeking FDA approval of new drugs (or hoping
to guarantee the availability of insurance reimbursement for prescrip-
tions) care whether the scientific community categorizes hyperten-
sion, obesity, or premenstrual syndrome as diseases.192 Lawyers who
represent parties in the ongoing breast implant litigation have an ob-
vious stake in the direction of research on connective-tissue disorders.
al., supra note 97, at 718 ("In the vacuum created by the paucity of scientific medical data,
MCS is rapidly becoming a politically defined illness.").
191. See ROBERT M. VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHIcS 22,159-61 (1981); see
also Ben A. Rich, Postmodern Medicine: Deconstructing the Hippocratic Oath, 65 U.
COLO. L. REv. 77 (1993).
192. See Johannes & Stecklow, supra note 75, at B8 (noting that the American Obesity
Association is largely supported by pharmaceutical companies rather than membership
dues); Joe Sharkey, it's a Mad, Mad, Mad, Mad World, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1997, at D1
(describing efforts to have PMS included in the DSM and one drug company's sponsorship
of supporting research).
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Also, as noted in connection with the discussion of both tort and
criminal litigation, nosological innovations may help promote and
perhaps also disguise significant doctrinal modifications.
Patient and social advocacy groups sometimes influence nosol-
ogy. Traditionally, at a time when disability programs reflected a
medical or rehabilitative rather than a civil rights model, condition-
specific associations formed to promote clinical research into their
members' particular disease. 93 More recently, most notably in the
case of AIDS, patients have formed advocacy groups to lobby legisla-
tors and regulators to support research and accelerate the availability
of potential treatments.194 But some experts warn that such "lobbying
could undermine scientific objectivity in decisions such as which dis-
eases are researched and how much funding those projects re-
ceive."' 95 In some situations, as in the case of chronic fatigue syn-
drome, patient support groups have formed primarily to demand that
medical professionals and the public take their ailments seriously.
196
The selection of diagnostic criteria also may have important legal
consequences. For instance, the CDC's surveillance activities draw
the attention of patient advocacy groups because of the inevitable use
193. See, e.g., JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY. PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A
NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 20-22 (1993) (discussing the activities of the Muscular
Dystrophy Association). Indeed, some commentators have suggested that the identifica-
tion of learning disabilities was driven in large measure by an organized effort by parents'
groups seeking special education services for their children without the associated stigma
of having them labeled as mentally retarded. See JAMES G. CARRIER, LEARNING
DISABILITY: SOCIAL CLASS AND THE CONSTRUCrION OF INEQUALITY IN AMERICAN
EDUCATION 93-104 (1986). A number of these organizations also make appeals directly
to the public in order to raise funds, for instance through public service announcements,
telethons, and even television dramas. See Andrea Petersen, Episodic Illnesses: How Rare
Ailments Get on Prime Time, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1998, at Al ("[H]ealth foundations
and patient-advocacy groups wooing Hollywood television writers and producers.., often
use emotional appeals and personal connections in hopes of landing a 'product placement'
for their illness in prime time.").
194. See William B. Rubenstein, Law and Empowerment: The Idea of Order in the Time
of AIDS, 98 YALE L.J. 975, 990-94 (1989) (book review); Lois K. Perrin, Note, The Catch-
22 for Persons with AIDS: To Have or Not to Have Easy Access to Experimental Therapies
and Early Approval for New Drugs, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 105, 121-27 (1995); Malcolm
Gladwell, Beyond HIV: The Legacies of Health Activism, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1992, at
A29 (noting that a decade of AIDS activism "has had a profound impact on U.S. regula-
tion, law and society far beyond the immediate world of those infected with HIV"); Jane
Gross, Turning Disease into Political Cause: First AIDS, and Now Breast Cancer, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7,1991, at A12.
195. Natalie Hopkinson, NIH Needs More Input from Public, Panel Report Says, WALL
ST. J., July 9, 1998, at B7 (summarizing remarks by Dr. Leon E. Rosenberg, a professor at
Princeton University who had chaired an Institute of Medicine committee charged with
reviewing NIH activities, concerning the success of AIDS and breast cancer patient advo-
cacy groups in lobbying Congress for additional funding of research into those diseases).
196. See ARONOWIZ, supra note 32, at 28,33-34.
January 1999] PIGEONHOLING ILLNESS
of these diagnostic criteria for other purposes: "Although the CDC's
various case definitions were developed primarily for surveillance ac-
tivities, these definitions have become the diagnostic standard used by
other federal, state, and local agencies to determine eligibility for en-
titlements and benefits."' 97 In addition to the availability of disability
benefits, CDC definitions may affect reimbursement to health care
providers, FDA review of therapeutic agents, and federal funding of
biomedical research.1 98 Over time, clinical researchers may narrow
the definition of novel diseases, potentially leading to conflicts be-
tween patient advocacy groups and clinicians-patients may feel "dis-
enfranchised" if their illness falls outside of increasingly refined diag-
nostic criteria.199
The debate about the existence of "Gulf War syndrome" pro-
vides a recent illustration of an advocacy group aggressively lobbying
for the formal recognition of a new ailment.2°° Gulf War syndrome
(GWS) has aspects of both MCS (premised on possible exposure to
biological agents and other toxins during combat) and post-traumatic
stress disorder. PTSD itself emerged as a diagnosis for Vietnam vet-
erans suffering from psychiatric problems that had been identified in
previous generations of soldiers as shell shock or combat fatigue.
Recognition of GWS would entitle many veterans of the Persian Gulf
War to medical and disability benefits.201 To date, however, biomedi-
197. Carol Levine & Gary L. Stein, What's in a Name? The Policy Implications of the
CDC Definition of AIDS, 19 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 278, 282 (1991) (adding that
"[t]his has had a significant impact, both positive and negative").
198. See id. at 278 ("distinguish[ing] the primary purpose of the CDC's surveillance
definition from the ancillary uses that it triggers in entitlements and benefits, funding for-
mulas, clinical research, medical care, and calculations of the costs of health care and so-
cial services"); id. at 282-87 (elaborating on some of these ancillary uses in the context of
the CDC's proposed modification of its case definition for AIDS). For a discussion of
subsequent proposed modifications in and applications of the CDC's definition of AIDS,
see 58 Fed. Reg. 36,008,36,009-10 (1993); 57 Fed. Reg. 35,832 (1992).
199. See ARONOWrrz, supra note 32, at 180 (discussing the evolution of understanding
about Lyme disease, and arguing against excessive scientific reductionism for excluding
idiosyncratic disease conditions).
200. See Walter Goodman, On Gulf Veterans, Head vs. the Heart, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
1998, at El0 (describing the conflict between scientific organizations and those supporting
the claims of veterans groups); Philip J. Hilts, Gulf War Syndrome: Is It a Real Disease?,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1993, at Cl; Gina Kolata, Stress Study May Hold Clue to Gulf War
Illness, Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1998, at A25; see also Kevin J. Dalton, Com-
ment, Gulf War Syndrome: Will the Injuries of Veterans and Their Families Be Redressed?,
25 U. BALT. L. REV. 179, 182-98 (1996); Claire Alida Milner, Comment, Gulf War Guinea
Pigs: Is Informed Consent Optional During War?, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
199,205-06 (1996).
201. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1163 (1994). Congress amended the statute to authorize dis-
ability payments under certain circumstances to Persian Gulf veterans "suffering from a
chronic disability resulting from an undiagnosed illness." Veterans' Benefits Improve-
ments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-446, § 106, 108 Stat. 4645, 4650 (codified at 38 U.S.C.
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cal researchers have failed to find much scientific support for these
nosological claims.
2°2
Both the AMA and the APA have published important diagnos-
tic guides, in some cases consciously geared toward forensic or reim-
bursement uses. These professional societies engage in more than a
taxonomic endeavor when they compile and promote these manuals.
As the significance of their diagnostic manuals grows, groups with a
stake in the outcome attempt to exert some influence, and the draft-
ing process inevitably becomes more politicized and less driven by
scientific expertise.20
3
Although the APA explicitly cautioned that DSM-IV was in-
tended primarily for therapeutic rather than forensic or reimburse-
ment purposes,2°4 that caveat has a decidedly hollow ring to it.205
Recognition in the DSM has become essential for securing health in-
surance coverage, so much so that patient groups and pharmaceutical
companies may lobby the APA to include new disorders.2°6 Para-
§ 1117 (1994)).
202. See Keiji Fukuda et al., Chronic Multisymptom Illness Affecting Air Force Veterans
of the Gulf War, 280 JAMA 981 (1998); Bill McAllister, Panel's Report Challenges Gulf
War Syndrome Theory, WASH. POST, Sept. 1,1998, at A8.
203. Cf. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492,500-02 (1988)
(reviewing antitrust claim against a company that had attempted to manipulate the process
of revising the National Electrical Code); Jonathan R. Macey, The Transformation of the
American Law Institute, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1212, 1225-32 (1993) (describing the
growing politicization of the process of drafting the Restatements of the Law); Alan
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L.
RnV. 595, 650-51 (1995) (explaining that interest group competition rather than expertise
dominates private law-making bodies).
204. See DSM-IV, supra note 115, at xxiii ("[T]he clinical diagnosis of a DSM-IV men-
tal disorder is not sufficient to establish the existence for legal purposes of a 'mental disor-
der,' 'mental disability,' 'mental disease,' or 'mental defect."'); id. at xxvii ("The clinical
and scientific considerations involved in categorization of these conditions as mental dis-
orders may not be wholly relevant to legal judgments .... ).
205. See KIRK & KuTCHINS, supra note 114, at 118 ("Of course, the architects of the
manual could not help but know that these were the concerns that were of great impor-
tance to most of its users."); id. at 214 ("[N]one of the revisions has been stimulated by
clinical practitioners demanding a new classification system. Since DSM is ostensibly a
clinical tool, outsiders may find this lack of clinician demand a curious fact."); id. at 106-07
(noting that a couple of proposed mental disorders were deleted for fear that they might
provide an inappropriate psychiatric defense in criminal trials); Robert D. Miller, History
of Psychiatric Diagnosis: A Guidebook for Nonclinicians, COLO. LAW., Jan. 1994, at 39,41
("The legal profession became involved in determining the legal effects, and sometimes
even the meaning, of certain diagnoses. The American Psychiatric Association responded
to these attempts to define psychiatric diagnoses for legal purposes by changing the crite-
ria for some of its diagnoses." (footnotes omitted)); see also Thomas E. Schacht, DSM-III
and the Politics of Truth, 40 AM. PSYCHOL. 513, 520 (1985) ("DSM-Ill is both a tool for
the production of scientific knowledge and an instrument of rhetoric, social organization,
and power distribution.").
206. See Sharkey, supra note 192, at Dl (describing efforts to add road rage and pre-
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doxically, the DSM's diagnostic criteria for mental disorders may end
up serving primarily non-therapeutic purposes, whether tied to reim-
bursement, forensic testimony, or basic research. As a commentator
noted in discussing the development of DSM-III, "[o]ne could not
help but be skeptical of a system in which illnesses are created or
eliminated substantially as a result of lobbying by special interest
groups."2 07 Other scholars have described legal influences on scien-
tific endeavors, particularly with regard to technological innova-
tion,208 but it is hard to imagine any comparable taxonomic process
influenced to this extent by non-scientific pressures external to the
discipline.209
Some commentators have applauded the tendency of litigation to
promote scientific research on important subjects, 210 but, if definitions
menstrual syndrome to the next edition of the DSM); see also Daniel Goleman, Who's
Mentally 1ll?, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Jan. 1978, at 34 ("If the diagnosis isn't in the manual, the
insurance company is unlikely to pay for treatment."). Thus, some have called the DSMs
"a gold mine for the profession." COLBY & SPAR, supra note 21, at 214; see also id. at 17
(calling DSM-III "a politically motivated compromise between differing interpretations of
the data, outright dogma, and propaganda"). My personal favorite is "Caffeine Intoxica-
tion" disorder. See DSM-IV, supra note 115, at 213.
207. Gerard, supra note 20, at 389 (adding, however, that legal institutions remain free
to ignore the DSM); see also John E. Helzer et al., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in the
General Population, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1630, 1630 (1987) ("[PTSD] was included as a
compromise after veterans' groups and mental health personnel engaged in caring for
Vietnam veterans spearheaded a drive for the recognition of a 'post-Vietnam syn-
drome."').
208. See STEVEN GOLDBERG, CULTURE CLASH: LAW AND SCIENCE IN AMERICA 178-
80, 183 (1994) ("Law does not threaten science through the legal control of basic research;
it threatens science through the adoption of legal norms by basic researchers."); SHEILA
JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA 208-
09, 213-14 (1995); Harold P. Green, The Law-Science Interface in Public Policy Decision-
making, 51 Omo ST. L.J. 375, 384 (1990) ("[Ijt is primarily the law that creates the societal
environment in which scientific activity takes place.").
209. In the former Soviet Union, the Communist Party pressured agronomists to repu-
diate scientific understandings about genetics in favor of environmental explanations for
plant variation that better conformed to Marxist ideology. See Bert Black et al., Science
and the Law in the Wake of Daubert" A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 715, 769-71 (1994) (discussing the rise of Lysenko under Stalin and the disastrous
impact of their denunciation of plant genetics on Soviet agriculture). The Soviet Union
also utilized psychiatric diagnoses and institutionalization to deal with political dissidents.
See Merskey, supra note 7, at 221; see also MARK G. FIELD, DOCTOR AND PATIENT IN
SOVIET RUSSIA 166-67 (1957) (describing government restrictions on the number of ill-
ness certifications that physicians could provide in response to growing worker absentee-
ism).
210. See Rebecca S. Dresser et al., Breast Implants Revisited: Beyond Science on Trial,
1997 WIS. L. REV. 705, 772 ("While litigation is not a good way to produce good science,
scientific studies are sometimes conducted, as in the DNA cases, in response to litigation,
and the breast implant controversy appears to be no exception." (footnotes omitted));
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Galileo's Tribute: Using Medical Evidence in Court, 95 MICH.
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of disease serve primarily forensic rather than therapeutic purposes,
the odds of objective and rigorous scientific testing may decrease.
21'
Instead, legal institutions may embrace and unwittingly promote un-
orthodox medicine.2 12 Also, to the extent that legal institutions con-
tribute to rapid nosological revisions, they may harm both the scien-
tific enterprise and patient care. If nosologies become moving
targets, biomedical researchers cannot adequately investigate their
clinical utility before revised definitions render their work moot.
213
Revisions also increase the risk of diagnostic errors as clinicians can-
not keep up with changes in nomenclature, which in turn complicates
communication among colleagues about their patients.214 None of
L. REV. 2055,2067 (1997) (book review); David L. Faigman, The Evidentiary Status of So-
cial Science Under Daubert: Is It "Scientific," "Technical," or "Other" Knowledge?, 1
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 960, 974 (1995) (arguing that more stringent rules of admissi-
bility for psychological testimony would encourage better research in this field).
211. Cf. Philip E. Enterline, Commentary, Toxic Torts: Are They Poisoning the Scien-
tific Literature?, 30 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 121, 122 (1996) (noting that, in epidemiological
studies sponsored by litigants, "the results are not usually made public unless they are fa-
vorable to the sponsor," and that "[t]his is unhealthy for the scientific literature"); Lars
Noah, Sanctifying Scientific Peer Review: Publication as a Proxy for Regulatory Decision-
making, 59 U. PITr. L. REV. 677, 705-09 (1998) (identifying several potential sources of
bias in biomedical publications). See generally Symposium, Biomedical Peer Review, 280
JAMA 213 (1998).
212. Cf. ANGELL, supra note 102, at 185-91 (arguing that public responses to health
scares such as silicone-gel breast implants, including the responses mediated by legal insti-
tutions, promote a growing anti-science movement and renewed interest in unorthodox
therapies); ELAINE SHOWALTER, HYSTORIES: HYSTERICAL EPIDEMICS AND MODERN
CULTURE 206 (1997) (describing the media's role in promoting novel diseases such as CFS
and GWS, and concluding that "the hysterical epidemics of the 1990s have already gone
on too long, and they continue to do damage: in distracting us from the real problems and
crises of modem society, in undermining a respect for evidence and truth, and in helping
support an atmosphere of conspiracy and suspicion"). For descriptions of the recent up-
surge of interest in alternative medicine, see David M. Eisenberg et al., Trends in Alternative
Medicine Use in the United States, 1990-1997, 280 JAMA 1569 (1998); Eliot Marshall, The
Politics of Alternative Medicine, 265 SCIENCE 2000 (1994); Denise Grady, Journal Casts a
Cold Eye on Alternative Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1997, at F6; see also MICHAEL H.
COHEN, COMPLEMENTARY AND ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE: LEGAL BOUNDARIES AND
REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES 118-19 (1998) ("The legal view of disease... must embrace
a broader understanding of healing than is reflected in biomedical orthodoxy.").
213. See Mark Zimmerman, Why Are We Rushing to Publish DSM-IV?, 45 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1135, 1136-38 (1988) (arguing that the recent rapidity of changes in the
DSM impeded scientific research into diagnostic criteria for psychiatric disorders and also
meant that revisions would not be able to take into account any new information because
they invariably outpaced the research).
214. See Irwin N. Perr, Medical and Legal Problems in Psychiatric Coding Under the
DSM and ICD Systems, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 418, 418-19 (1984); see also Maranto, su-
pra note 184, at F7 ("[P]eople become less able to name and deal with their problems.
Meaning is lost as phrases like 'feeling blue,' give way to psychological jargon. As more
people seek professional help, the ranks of psychotherapists grow, and so the technical
terminology proliferates.").
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this is meant to discount scientific and other non-legal motivations for
pursuing basic disease research, but one should not dismiss the pecu-
liar incentives created or mediated by different legal institutions and
their possible adverse consequences for biomedical work.
B. Diagnostic Dishonesty
Even with uncontroversial diseases, legal institutions may distort
the diagnosis of individual patients. For instance, it appears that
health care providers, in response to payment restrictions by public
and also private insurers, may misrepresent their diagnostic judg-
ments to ensure coverage for their patients. And, to the extent that
courts admit expert medical testimony concerning novel injury claims
such as multiple chemical sensitivity, chronic fatigue syndrome, or
atypical autoimmune diseases, such labels do not appear to help phy-
sicians when they are treating these patients. Is there anything wrong
with such behavior? Is it ethical, does such complicity carry with it
any demoralization costs for medical professionals, and do "fudged"
diagnoses pose any potential hazards for the subsequent treatment of
patients?
To help answer such questions, one could craft a simple hierar-
chy of possible motivations for providing a diagnosis. As emphasized
from the outset, therapeutic justifications traditionally rank as the
primary, if not exclusive, rationale for identifying diseases in patients.
Diagnosis is only a means to the end of selecting the most appropriate
course of treatment. Second, diagnoses may be generated as a means
to the end of ensuring payment for the most appropriate course of
treatment, which one might call "economic advocacy" in pursuit of
patient therapy. Third, medical professionals may dispense diagnoses
at the request of their patients to assist in securing benefits of various
types from legal institutions, which one might characterize as "foren-
sic advocacy" in pursuit of the patient's overall welfare (more broadly
conceived than therapy). Finally, medical professionals may record
diagnoses for their own personal gain, in effect to defraud insurers or
to protect themselves from malpractice or disciplinary actions in the
event of serious treatment errors. This Article largely disregards the
last motivation, focusing instead on economic and forensic advocacy,
where legal institutions exert their influence, and asking to what ex-
tent these conflict with the therapeutic rationale for diagnosing pa-
tients.
Some commentators have criticized overly rigid disease classifi-
cation systems such as the lCD for encouraging physicians to render
more specific diagnoses of patients than are warranted by the data. 15
215. See ALVAN R. FEINSTEIN, CLINICAL JUDGMENT 96 (1967); see also GLENN, supra
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Such concerns are compounded when reimbursement turns on diag-
nostic labels. As insurance coverage becomes linked more directly to
patient diagnoses, incentives may develop to gear diagnoses in order
to maximize reimbursement, 216 a phenomenon some have labeled
"DRG creep. ' 217 Similarly, to the extent that public and private in-
surers attempt to control charges by physicians, some doctors have
responded by "upcoding" procedures to ensure reimbursement.
218
Indeed, in one survey, a majority of physicians found nothing unethi-
cal about misstating, for insurance purposes, the reasons for ordering
a diagnostic test.2 19 At some level, this behavior is less an overt at-
note 4, at xviii, 89, 107 ("[W]hat is communicated is just an abbreviation of the whole,
written for the insurance company's benefit or to 'give a handle on the illness' to someone
who has asked for it."); Allan S. Brett, New Guidelines for Coding Physicians' Services-A
Step Backward, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1705, 1707 (1998) ("Coding guidelines influence the
substance of the clinical encounter, because they implicitly specify the elements of a medical
encounter that are valued by those who compensate physicians for their work.").
216. See David M. Frankford, The Medicare DRGs: Efficiency and Organizational Ra-
tionality, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 273, 322 (1993) ("There is no dispute that hospitals have
expended considerable effort to upcode their discharges into higher paying DRGs."); id.
at 329 ("Everyone in the hospital cheerfully can agree to game the coding system so as to
increase the hospital's reimbursement."); Frankford, supra note 48, at 648-55 (elaborating
on the prevalence of DRG "upcoding" by hospitals); Mary R. Koher, Note, When the
Whole Exceeds the Sum of Its Parts: Why Existing Utilization Management Practices Don't
Measure Up, 53 U. PrIT. L. REv. 1061, 1081 n.107 (1992) ("Physicians have even managed
to turn a profit on Medicare's PPS. By learning which ICD-9-CM codes trigger classifica-
tion into a higher reimbursement DRG, physicians and hospitals have learned how to
make Medicare work to their advantage.").
217. Donald W. Simborg, DRG Creep: A New Hospital-Acquired Disease, 304 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1602, 1604 (1981) ("Continuing physician 'education' could certainly be im-
plicated. There are legitimate medical vagaries and uncertainties in many diagnostic situa-
tions.... Minor diagnostic nuances and slight imprecisions of wording have little practical
clinical importance, yet under DRG reimbursement they would have major financial con-
sequences."); see also Lisa I. Iezzoni & Mark A. Moskowitz, Clinical Overlap Among
Medical Diagnosis-Related Groups, 255 JAMA 927, 927-28 (1986) (suggesting that many
patients could fit into a number of DRGs, in which case the most remunerative one will be
chosen); Mark Notman et al., Social Policy and Professional Self-Interest: Physician Re-
sponses to DRGs, 25 Soc. Sci. & MED. 1259, 1266 (1987) ("[Physicians] have found ways
of getting around system constraints to continue to give their patients the medical care
they feel is appropriate and to help the hospital maximize reimbursement.").
218. See COLBY & SPAR, supra note 21, at 17 ("You will fill out forms in order to get
paid by third-party carriers. For remuneration, you will, in part, make-believe just like all
of us [psychiatrists] do."); id. at 30 ("[D]iagnosis is a silly game that all doctors, not just
psychiatrists, play with insurance companies."); GLENN, supra note 4, at 70 ("[P]hysicians
cannot be reimbursed for their work unless it is characterized as treatment of an illness.");
id. at 159 (noting that physicians "must often use some other diagnosis in order to be re-
imbursed by most 'third-party' payers," and adding that this "is time-consuming, aggra-
vating, and feels inherently dishonest"); Rhonda L. Rundle, Medical Rip-Off. How Doc-
tors Boost Bills by Misrepresenting the Work They Do, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6,1989, at Al.
219. See Dennis H. Novack et al., Physicians' Attitudes Toward Using Deception to Re-
solve Difficult Ethical Problems, 261 JAMA 2980,2984 (1989) ("Most of our respondents
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tempt to deceive than it is a medical fiction,220 a transparent effort to
inject some flexibility into an otherwise unduly rigid system for classi-
fying illnesses experienced by patients.
Mental health professionals also engage in deliberate misdiagno-
sis, though the issues become somewhat more complicated in this
context. Because psychiatric disorders carry a stigma, and review of
insurance claim forms may breach client confidences, clinicians some-
times intentionally underdiagnose their patients.M1 This tendency
does not, however, necessarily counterbalance the corresponding in-
centives to overdiagnose in order to secure third-party reimburse-
ment.m Because of the difficulty in ensuring coverage for mental ill-
nesses, coupled with the non-specificity of diagnostic categories,M
mental health professionals understandably may rationalize upcoding
even more readily than physicians.224 Indeed, as suggested earlier, di-
were willing to misrepresent a screening test as a diagnostic test to ensure payment. This
raises the possibility that offering 'creative diagnoses' to third-party payers may be a wide-
spread practice.").
220. Cf. LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FicrIoNs 6 (1967) (explaining that "a fiction is distin-
guished from a lie by the fact that it is not intended to deceive").
221. See Steven S. Sharfstein et al., Accuracy of Diagnostic Information Submitted to an
Insurance Company, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 70, 72 (1980); see also Bruce G. Link et al.,
The Effectiveness of Stigma Coping Orientations: Can Negative Consequences of Mental
Illness Labeling Be Avoided?, 32 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAv. 302, 315-16 (1991) (discuss-
ing the stigma associated with a diagnosis of mental illness).
222. See KIRK & KUTCHINS, supra note 114, at 241 ("The sensitivity of clinicians to the
potential negative effects of psychiatric labeling, which may encourage the practice of un-
derdiagnosis, does not completely counteract the financial pressure to overdiagnose."); id.
at 244 ("[B]ecause of the structure of third-party reimbursement for certain psychiatric
diagnoses, the clinical ambiguities involved present mental health organizations with irre-
sistible opportunities to gain fiscal resources by merely labeling and mislabeling clinical
conditions."); Stuart A. Kirk & Herb Kutchins, Deliberate Misdiagnosis in Mental Health
Practice, 62 Soc. SERv. REv. 225,229-32 (1988) (discussing a survey finding that both un-
der- and overdiagnosing were prevalent).
223. See KIRK & KUTCHINS, supra note 114, at 240 ("In mental health practice, diag-
nostic latitude is particularly great... [and] deliberate misdiagnoses are hard to detect.
Furthermore, when the nature of the disorder is itself ambiguous, controversial, unverifi-
able, and subject to extraclinical influences, intentional falsification may merge with un-
conscious distortion."); id. at 235 ("[I]t could be argued that despite a deceptive official
diagnosis, the treatment used was based on the 'real,' if unofficial, diagnosis.... However,
many third-party payers insist that treatment conform to the diagnosis."); id. at 239 ("Be-
cause there is no professional consensus about the appropriate treatment for specific dis-
orders, the importance of misdiagnosis is often discounted.").
224. See id. at 239.
One explanation for the apparent indifference to deliberate misdiagnosis is that
both under- and overdiagnosing are justified as either harmless or in the client's
best interest; the client is helped to avoid a stigmatizing label or to obtain needed
services. The DSM-III code may be viewed by clinicians as a fiscal formality un-
related to treatment, a white lie for a good purpose.
[Vol. so
agnoses of mental disorders may represent nothing more than post
hoe rationalizations for therapeutic interventions that happened to
prove effective.22
Even when done for a seemingly good cause, such prevarication
may erode public trust in the medical profession.226 In her classic
book on lying, Sissela Bok warned that "the entire institution of
medicine is threatened by practices lacking in candor, however
harmless the results may appear in some individual cases." 227 Diag-
nostic dishonesty may backfire in a number of ways. Occasional
fudging to circumvent restrictive coverage rules may unwittingly per-
petuate reimbursement policies that physicians should assail more di-
rectly. If gaming becomes sufficiently widespread, payers may
225. See id. at 235 ("There are also circumstances in mental health organizations where
the treatment determines the diagnosis; the diagnosis is made only after a particular
treatment has been found to be effective. If the patient got better with lithium, the diag-
nosis should be bipolar affective disorder."); see also supra notes 22-23 and accompanying
text.
226. See Novack et al., supra note 219, at 2985 ("The physicians' overriding concern
with patient welfare, consistent with the Hippocratic tradition, gives less consideration to
questions about the potential harm to others of deceiving.... What harm may ensue if the
policy of deceiving in certain circumstances becomes more general, and how will that af-
fect public trust in the profession?"); E. Haavi Morreim, Gaming the System: Dodging the
Rules, Ruling the Dodgers, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 443, 445 (1991) ("Where there
is good reason to suspect that the payer is 'gaming the patient,' the physician may be
sorely tempted to dodge its rules.... [This, however,] carries formidable moral and medi-
cal hazards. It can violate principles of nonmaleficence, veracity and justice."); cf. Carol
M. Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REv. 531 (1995) (discussing the im-
portance of trust in other contexts); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and
What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 1037, 1041-48 (1996) (discussing the negative
effects of lying by law enforcement officials in preparing reports and testifying at suppres-
sion hearings); Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by
the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 797-800 (1997) (same). For a discussion of the nature and
negative consequences of gaming in administrative law, see Lars Noah, Sham Petitioning
as a Threat to the Integrity of the Regulatory Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1995).
227. SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRiVATE LIFE 68 (1978);
see also id. at 233 ("[Patient] fear is further nourished by the loss of trust in health profes-
sionals. In part, the loss of trust results from the abuses which have been exposed .... ").
She focused on two primary types of deception in the medical context. First, Bok criti-
cized the widespread use of placebos in treating patient complaints. See id. at 63 ("Even
apart from financial and emotional costs and the squandering of resources, the practice of
giving placebos is wasteful of a very precious good: the trust on which so much in the
medical relationship depends."); id. at 67 ("In view of all these ways in which placebo us-
age can spread, it is not enough to look at each incident of manipulation in isolation, no
matter how benevolent it may be."). Second, she questioned failures to disclose candidly
the severity of illness to dying patients. See id. at 222 ("Lying to patients has, therefore,
seemed an especially excusable act. Some would argue that doctors, and only doctors,
should be granted the right to manipulate the truth .... ).
228. See Morreim, supra note 226, at 445 ("Where physicians routinely game their way
around an undesirable resource rule instead of openly challenging it, they may help to
perpetuate unwise policies."); id. ("Where [government insurance] policies are unwise or
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clamp down and further erode physician autonomy.229 In either case,
patient welfare ultimately could suffer. In addition, widespread mis-
diagnosis may undermine public health surveillance and intervention
efforts, providing policymakers with inaccurate data on the preva-
lence and severity of particular diseases in the populationO °
Finally, upcoding may directly compromise the treatment of pa-
tients. "[I]f a physician exaggerates the seriousness of a patient's
condition to utilization review officers on the telephone, he or she
may have to write those exaggerations in the chart, thus jeopardizing
the patient's future care."'231 In one particularly striking case, a physi-
cian had upcoded the diagnostic rationale for ordering a CT scan for
purposes of filing a Medicare claim form.232 Rather than justify the
procedure as an effort to rule out the possibility of brain cancer,
which Medicare apparently would not have reimbursed, the neurolo-
gist "diagnosed" the patient as having a brain tumor. The patient in-
advertently received a copy of the completed insurance form and
inadequate they should be corrected not by a gaming that undermines both the social deci-
sion and the democratic process by which it was made but, rather, through public discus-
sion.").
229. See id. ("[N]o resource system can long survive widespread abuse and dishonesty,
nor can physicians expect to retain either their professional integrity or, equally important,
their clinical autonomy, if they treat with duplicity those who own the medical and mone-
tary resources essential to their patients' care."). Physicians who fudge diagnoses may also
lose credibility with jurors in medical malpractice cases. See id.
230. See KIRK & KUTCHINS, supra note 114, at 242 ("Policy and program development
in mental health frequently rely on reported rates of treated disorder. Are depression,
alcoholism, and schizophrenia becoming more or less prevalent? Uncharted and unrecog-
nized distortion of diagnostic practices could lead to invalid conclusions and misguided
intervention efforts."); id. ("Deliberate misdiagnosis to avoid stigma or to obtain reim-
bursement for treatment for individual clients cannot be justified ethically or legally, but
such practices, in the aggregate, present even greater problems for mental health plan-
ners."); see also Lawrence K. Altman, Diagnoses and the Autopsies Are Found to Differ
Greatly, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1998, at A16 (noting that, because "[a]utopsies help monitor
public health by identifying new diseases and changes in ones long recognized," concerns have
arisen about declining autopsy rates); Lawrence K Altman, Getting It Right on the Facts of
Death, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22,1998, at F7 (reporting that "death certificate information is often
flawed, and that misinformation can affect policy," adding that "even hospital billing prac-
ticesi] can influence what is listed as a cause of death," leading to "comments in medical jour-
nals that some certificates 'are pure fabrication'").
231. Morreim, supra note 226, at 445 ("Similarly, a psychiatrist who identifies a pa-
tient's illness according to the most serious, best-reimbursed diagnosis... may needlessly
stigmatize the patient elsewhere in life."); see also KIRK & KUTCHINS, supra note 114, at
233 ("A deliberately false diagnosis, whatever the merits of the motivation behind it, offi-
cially labels a client as suffering from a mental disorder that he or she in fact does not
have."); id. at 239 ("To the extent that there are negative effects of psychiatric labeling,
overdiagnosis may unnecessarily harm the client."); WILLIAM 0. ROBERTSON, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: A PREVENTIVE APPROACH 19-21 (1985) (noting that problems in written
communication can precipitate treatment errors).
232. See Stafford v. Neurological Med., Inc., 811 F.2d 470,471-72 (8th Cir. 1987).
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soon thereafter committed suicide. Her husband then sued the neu-
rologist and his employer for negligence, and the jury returned a ver-
dict in favor of the plaintiff. Although the trial judge granted the de-
fendants' post-trial motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
on the ground that no reasonable jury could find that the neurolo-
gist's act had caused his patient's suicide, the appellate court reversed
and remanded the case for entry of the judgment in the plaintiff's fa-
vor. 3
The medical profession may need to address diagnostic dishon-
esty through revisions in ethical codes for practitioners. Historically,
codes were notable for the absence of any guidance on the impor-
tance of veracity in dealing with patients and third parties. 4 The
AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics now provide that "[a] physician
shall deal honestly with patients and colleagues, and strive to expose
those physicians.., who engage in fraud or deception." 5 External
checks exist in some contexts, such as prohibitions on fraud in the
Medicare program or on peIjury in judicial and administrative pro-
ceedings, but diagnostic upcoding in these settings does not necessar-
ly transgress rules against outright fabrication,2 6 and physicians may
too readily agree to help their patients when asked to provide a diag-
nosis that attests to the genuineness of a patient's illness for some
collateral purpose. Some professional associations have responded
by providing ethical guidance limiting the appropriate scope of foren-
sic testimony.27
233. See id. at 473-75.
234. See BOK, supra note 227, at xvi ("Honesty from health professionals matters more
to patients than almost everything else that they experience when ill. Yet the requirement
to be honest with patients has been left out altogether from medical oaths and codes of
ethics, and is often ignored, if not actually disparaged, in the teaching of medicine."); id. at
223 ("[Veracity] is absent from virtually all oaths, codes, and prayers. The Hippocratic
Oath makes no mention of truthfulness to patients about their condition, prognosis, or
treatment.").
235. AMA COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS:
CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS xiv (1998). However, the accompanying anno-
tations suggest that this principle is directed primarily at other types of problems. See id.
at xx-xxiii.
236. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(1)(A) (1994); see also United States v. Larm, 824 F.2d
780,782-83 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding Medicaid fraud conviction of allergist for upcoding
treatments); JOSEPH A. SNOE, AMERICAN HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEMS 641, 646-
47 (1998) (explaining that DRG upcoding may violate prohibitions against Medicare
fraud); cf. United States v. Krizek, 859 F. Supp. 5, 8-12 (D.D.C. 1994) (finding that a psy-
chiatrist had violated the False Claims Act for overbilling but not for allegedly upcoding
treatments); Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, Conceptualizing, Estimating, and
Reforming Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Healthcare Spending, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 455, 487
(1994) (noting that most upcoding involves close judgment calls rather than clear fraud,
and doubting that it represents a significant problem).
237. See AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, ETHICAL
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As mentioned previously, medical professionals have become
important gatekeepers in disability benefit programs.238 Indeed, ac-
cording to Michel Foucault, this became true in France two centuries
ago: "In addition to [the doctor's] role as a technician of medicine, he
would play an economic role in the distribution of help, and a moral,
quasi-judicial role in its attribution." 39 As one court explained more
recently:
Today, the patient commonly, and necessarily, enlists the aid of his
or her physician in preparing claims forms for health and disability
benefits. Such forms ordinarily require information possessed
solely by the treating physician as well as the physician's signature
attesting to the bona fides of that medical information.
24°
Obligations to assist patients seeking to secure payment do not, how-
ever, contemplate that physicians assume a broader advocacy role for
their patients.241 Their professional relationship is primarily a thera-
GUIDELINES FOR THE PRACTICE OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY (1991); American Psychol.
Ass'n, Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
1597, 1610 § 7.04(b) (1992) (calling on psychologists to acknowledge the limits of their fo-
rensic assessments); see also MELTON ET AL., supra note 18, at 17 (arguing that, even if
courts allow or urge mental health professionals to testify about ultimate issues or legal
conclusions, psychiatrists and others should not exceed the scope of their expertise).
238. See supra note 161 and accompanying text; see also Timothy S. Carey & Nortin M.
Hadler, The Role of the Primary Physician in Disability Determination for Social Security
Insurance and Workers' Compensation, 104 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 706 (1986); Pryor,
supra note 174, at 813 ("[P]hysicians make hundreds of thousands of 'disability determina-
tions' each year for purposes of eligibility to benefits of some type.").
239. FOUCAULT, supra note 28, at 42; see also id. at 41 ("[T]he doctor began to play a
decisive role in the organization of assistance.... [lit was the doctor who discovered
where it was needed and judged the nature and degree of the assistance to be given.").
240. Chew v. Meyer, 527 A.2d 828, 832 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987); see also The Inter-
professional Code 1987, 65 DENV. U. L. REv. 267, 271 (1988) ("[T]he primary duty of a
physician is to treat a patient's illness or injuries. However, an additional responsibility of
a treating physician is to provide necessary medical information and opinions by virtue of
his or her acceptance of that patient for treatment.., if such information will aid the judi-
cial process.").
241. See AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9.07 (1997) ("If a patient who has a
legal claim requests a physician's assistance, the physician should furnish medical evidence....
The medical witness must not become an advocate or a partisan in the legal proceeding."); see
also Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 883-84 (Ct. App. 1990) (noting that a physi-
cian might be held jointly liable for the consequences of the denial of insurance coverage);
Murphy v. Godwin, 303 A.2d 668, 673 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973) ("[T]he question of a doctor's
legal duty toward his patients with respect to completing insurance forms is apparently
novel. The existence of such a duty may be found, however, by reference to established
tort theory and recognized incidents of the doctor-patient relationship."); GLENN, supra
note 4, at 149 ("[T]hey can be trusted to tell the truth to the courts, not to give welfare cer-
tificates out indiscriminately, and to weed out moral slouchers from the ranks of the truly
sick. However, the recent view of physicians (especially the family physician) as the pa-
tient's advocate appears to challenge this."); William M. Sage, Physicians as Advocates, 35
HOUS. L. REV. 1529 (1999) (criticizing the shift to a patient advocacy role).
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peutic one.
In addition, in both civil and criminal litigation, medical profes-
sionals frequently testify about the condition of one of the parties. To
the extent that treating physicians are willing to certify that their pa-
tient suffers from some novel disease,242 they have been criticized for
complicity with the lawyers pressing these claims for recovery or di-
minished capacity.243 If these complaints have merit, legal institutions
must design mechanisms to prevent such misconduct.244 This Article,
however, inquires whether the medical profession needs to concern
itself with the extent to which legal institutions have influenced the
diagnostic enterprise.
Delinkage offers one solution. Rather than cloak legal decisions
about eligibility with seemingly objective and authoritative clinical
judgments, courts and agencies could reduce their reliance on medical
diagnoses. The ADA does this to some extent by making the re-
quirement for a physical or mental impairment quite loose and only a
threshold step leading to more difficult non-medical inquiries, in con-
trast to the Family and Medical Leave Act's or the SSA's much
greater dependence on purely medical determinations of disability.
In addition, managed care reimbursement methods that pay providers
a flat amount per year to care for each enrolled member (capitation)
may help reduce incentives for upcoding2 45
242 See ANGELL, supra note 102, at 131 ("The common contention that breast im-
plants cause diseases that cannot be objectively described is a theory that cannot be tested.
Doctors who believe in it simply assert that such diseases exist and that they know them
when they see them."); EDWARD SHORTER, FROM PARALYSIS TO FATIGUE: A HISTORY
OF PSYCHOSOMATIC ILLNESS IN THE MODERN ERA 317 (1992) (noting that "[t]he
chronic fatigue subculture brims with folklore about choosing physicians thought to be
sympathetic").
243. See ANGELL, supra note 102, at 147-52, 207 ("The lawyers could not exploit the
breast implant controversy without the help of doctors who collect fees for making what
are often dubious diagnoses.... [T]he medical profession as a whole bears some respon-
sibility for the fact that a small group of doctors is able to get away with such blatantly un-
ethical behavior."); Robert L. Brent, The Irresponsible Expert Witness: A Failure of Bio-
medical Graduate Education and Professional Accountability, 70 PEDIATRICS 754, 755-56
(1982); Gina Kolata & Barry Meier, Implant Lawsuits Create a Medical Rush to Cash In,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1995, at Al.
244. See Gerard, supra note 20, at 413 ("If the legal system fails to establish standards
to control the degree of reliability a diagnosis must have to make it admissible as evidence,
experts can put any diagnostic label they wish upon any individual they choose."); see also
Steven I. Friedland, Law, Science and Malingering, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.I. 337 (1998).
245. See George J. Annas, When Should Preventive Treatment Be Paid for by Health
Insurance?, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1027, 1029 (1994) (noting that the shift to capitation
may "slow the proliferation of new 'diseases"'); see also Frances H. Miller, Foreword; The
Promise and Problems of Capitation, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 167 (1996); Barbara A. Noah,
The Managed Care Dilemma: Can Theories of Tort Liability Adapt to the Realities of Cost
Containment?, 48 MERCER L. REv. 1219, 1225-27 (1997). Upcoding might still occur to
circumvent restrictive utilization rules such as limitations on referrals to specialists.
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Courts might do well to show less deference to the expert testi-
mony of a party's treating physician or clinical psychiatrist, in favor of
evidence from epidemiologists and forensic psychiatrists whose testi-
mony can satisfy more stringent admissibility criteria. For instance, in
a tort suit involving an emotional distress claim, it makes more sense
for courts to credit general evidence about the prevalence of PTSD
among civilians exposed to industrial accidents than to rely on the es-
sentially untestable diagnosis of PTSD by the plaintiff's treating phy-
sician. Such "social framework" evidence would not eliminate the
need to demonstrate that the plaintiff manifests behaviors and other
signs of this disorder, but a treating physician or mental health profes-
sional would not be essential for even this limited purpose if other
experts had described the characteristics to the jury.
Indeed, one could avoid using diagnostic labels altogether, al-
lowing clinicians to testify only about facts elicited during the evalua-
tive interview such as statements by the patient, observed behaviors,
and the results of laboratory tests. The drawing of any inferences
from this raw data would remain within the province of the fact-
finder asked to decided whether those signs had some legal relevance.
Clinicians could not testify about ultimate issues or even convey their
conclusory diagnostic labels which might unduly influence the deci-
sionmaker.246 Such delinkage would encourage more careful role dif-
ferentiation by medical professionals. Because the forensic experts
have no therapeutic relationship with the plaintiff and would not pur-
port to diagnose conclusively his or her alleged disorder, there is less
of a risk that the forensic assessment will negatively affect subsequent
clinical treatment.
Legal institutions could get along without resort to medical diag-
nosis, though agencies and courts surely would resist losing this ready
proxy or short-cut for making difficult decisions. In whatever form,
delinkage may help reduce existing incentives to gear diagnoses to-
ward non-therapeutic ends. Such reforms would free medical profes-
sionals to focus on their primary role as care-givers to patients suf-
fering from some illness. 247 As an added benefit, the quality of legal
decisionmaking may improve in these contexts.248
246. See Morse, supra note 20, at 625; Cf. MELTON ET AL., supra note 18, at 17-20 (ar-
guing that mental health professionals should only be barred from testifying about ulti-
mate issues and legal conclusions about which they lack expertise).
247. See LEE COLEMAN, THE REIGN OF ERROR: PSYcHIATRY, AUTHORITY, AND
LAW 242-45 (1984).
248. See id. at 242 ("If this divorce were accomplished, the criminal justice system
would do a better job of law enforcement, the courts would do a better job of deciding
civil and criminal questions, and psychiatry would finally be free to offer honest and vol-
untary services to those who want help."); Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 109, at 457
("Many clinicians have no business in the courtroom. Their training in clinical methods of
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Diagnostic labels have significant consequences for patients. As
Dr. Aronowitz wrote: "Modem classificatory practices... run the risk
of constructing diseases that may have little or no clinical significance
yet carry costs to individuals and society, such as iatrogenic harm,
worry, stigma, and abuse of the sick role." 249 To the extent that some
of the novel illnesses have a psychogenic origin, diagnostic labels ac-
tually may be counterproductive in caring for these patients.250 Al-
though the suggestion of a physiological cause may help legitimize
their undoubted illness, persons suffering from depression will not
improve if they receive a CFS diagnosis from a sympathetic physician
along with a prescription for vitamin supplements321 Assigning such
inquiry and treatment encourages them to err in the direction of diagnosing illness, invites
many of them to speculate wildly about unconscious determinants of behavior, and fre-
quently discourages systematic theoretical inquiry."); see also JASANOFF, supra note 208,
at 123-26 (noting objections to the "treating physician syndrome" in tort litigation).
249. ARONOWITZ, supra note 32, at 107 ("This is no mere semantic exercise. . . ."); see
also id. at 246 n.20 ("Diagnosing disease is an act with consequences, not merely a cogni-
tive exercise that matches the particular patient to specific disease criteria.").
When I make a diagnosis of hypertension, my patient's life might change in any
number of ways:.., by becoming fearful of developing a heart attack or stroke,
by quitting a high-pressured job and looking for a less pressured one out of con-
cern about the effect of stress on heart disease, or by taking medications that lead
to impotence, cough, or bad dreams. None of these effects directly result from
pathophysiological derangements associated with high blood pressure itself;
rather, they are effects of behaviors and attitudes triggered by the act of diagno-
sis.
Id.; see also id. at 37 ("In an era in which the financial burden of health care coupled with a
perception of declining or static health gains is generally recognized as the major problem
facing modern medicine, more attention might be paid to the costs and health effects of
the creation of new diseases .. ").
250. See id. at 19 ("Almost every branch of medicine makes use of such 'functional' di-
agnoses.... Often both physician and patient are left with the uneasy feeling that organic
disease has been missed or that important but difficult to manage psychosocial issues have
been sidestepped."); GLENN, supra note 4, at 69 ("[T]he patient's distress soon becomes
transformed into a 'disease,' thus blurring the real meaning of his or her experience.");
Kirkland, supra note 108, at 92 (warning that a PTSD-based claim "can develop into a
situation that creates an actual disservice to the patient from a therapeutic point of view in
that acceptance of an inaccurate etiology of the problem is fostered"); Synder et al., supra
note 95, at 110 ("Reinforcement of illness behavior by unjustifiably giving a patient a di-
agnosis of a disease.., that is clinically unsubstantiated or invalid may actually perpetuate
illness, prolong disability, and delay effective therapy."); Rosenthal, supra note 167, at Cl
("Neurologists say that they are being called upon to resolve a barrage of legal disputes
[involving chronic pain] but that litigation frequently clouds diagnosis and interferes with
medical care.").
251. See Simon Wessely, Old Wine in New Bottles: Neurasthenia and "ME," 20
PSYCHOL. MED. 35, 50 (1990) ("Patients may be denied the most appropriate treatment
available, and may instead receive 'new' diagnoses which are later found to be spuri-
ous .... Such uncritical diagnoses may reinforce maladaptive behaviour, and may create
more severe and persistent morbidity than the initial illness ... ."); see also BOK, supra
note 227, at 63 ("[T]he resort to placebos may actually prevent the treatment of an under-
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vague syndrome labels may "contribut[e] to dysfunctional illness be-
havior patterns that increase disability and medical dependency,
waste resources, and add to iatrogenic illness." 2 The disdain for
psychological explanations of illness, suggesting that such a diagnosis
makes the patient's complaint less genuine, arises from numerous
sources2 3 To some extent, legal institutions contribute to this pref-
erence for physiological explanations of disease, and some in the
medical profession have satisfied these demands even where such di-
agnoses do not serve-or, worse yet, disserve-therapeutic purposes.
Conclusion
What does it mean to be ill? It depends in part on whom you
ask. Physicians, historians, philosophers, and sociologists have strug-
gled to answer this important question. It also depends on why you
want to know. The traditional response would emphasize therapeutic
purposes, in which case the medical model of disease made perfect
sense. If, however, non-therapeutic motives underlie the question,
then the range of possible answers might proliferate and depart sub-
stantially from the medical model. Legal institutions, by looking to
medical professionals for answers to non-therapeutic questions about
disease, have failed to appreciate these distinctions.
Why should we care that legal institutions misunderstand the an-
swers that they receive to their non-therapeutic questions about the
meaning of disease? At one level, it may distort decisions having im-
portant personal, financial, and societal consequences, and legal deci-
sionmakers may wish to reorient their understandings of illness for
that reason alone. At another level, which this Article has empha-
sized, the misunderstanding and distortion may rebound in various
lying, undiagnosed problem.").
252. Timothy E. Quill et al., The Medicalization of Normal Variants: The Case of Mitral
Valve Prolapse, 3 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 267, 275 (1988). "Using diseases such as nor-
mal-variant [mitral valve prolapse] to explain complex human experience is an unscien-
tific, inhumane oversimplification,... and contributes to the somatization and medicaliza-
tion of the patient." Id. at 273; see also Donald W. Black, Environmental Illness and
Misdiagnosis-A Growing Problem, 18 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 23,29-30
(1993) (objecting to the diagnosis of MCS on similar grounds); Ronald E. Gots, Multiple
Chemical Sensitivities-Public Policy, 33 CLINICAL TOXICOLOGY 111, 113 (1995) ("[T]he
diagnosis of MCS has the paradoxical effect, not of helping the victim, but of condemning
him or her to a course of misguided treatment destined to enhance disability.").
253. See KLEINMAN, supra note 5, at 59 (noting "the unwillingness of many [chronic]
pain patients to accept psychosocial explanations that appear to deny that their pain is
founded in a 'real' bodily experience deserving of somatic remedies and a legitimate medi-
cal sick role"); SHORTER, supra note 242, at 317 ("The rejection of psychiatric diagnoses
by chronic fatigue patients is much more violent than are the normal reactions of medical
patients to psychiatric consultation, and is itself a characteristic of the illness. Anything
smacking of psychiatry or psychology is completely taboo.").
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ways that influence the behavior of medical professionals. In this re-
spect, legal institutions do more than make a mistake in relying on di-
agnostic judgments for their own non-therapeutic purposes; by be-
coming dependent on these medical judgments, they also distort
nosology and diagnosis in ways that may threaten clinical research
and patient care.
Various legal institutions play an important role in the diagnostic
enterprise, though these institutions are not the only, or even the
most important, factor in defining and identifying illness. Their influ-
ence is, however, largely ignored. Nor do courts and agencies seem to
understand their potentially significant effects on the definition and
identification of disease, even if they sense that nosology and diagno-
sis may lack the degree of objectivity and trustworthiness typically as-
cribed to these scientific and clinical judgments. It bears repeating,
however, that one should not idealize the diagnostic process or exag-
gerate the influence of legal institutions. If the social constructivists
are correct, even total delinkage by courts and agencies would not
make nosology and diagnosis approach the therapeutic ideal of the
traditional medical model of disease, which has never existed in any
event.
Beyond hoping to promote heightened awareness, this Article
has proposed some tentative responses to the ways in which legal in-
stitutions influence medical diagnosis. Courts and agencies can try to
delink themselves from an overreliance on the gatekeeping role tradi-
tionally placed on treating physicians, and the medical profession
should insist on a clearer demarcation between diagnostic judgments
for therapeutic purposes and forensic diagnoses. Organized medicine
should not unnecessarily multiply nosologies in response to reim-
bursement pressures or perceived forensic opportunities, and physi-
cians should not feel pressured into becoming zealous advocates for
their patients outside of the therapeutic relationship. Otherwise,
health care professionals risk losing sight of the primary purpose for
making a diagnosis, namely, caring for a patient with an illness.
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